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     BEFORE:
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     HON SHELLEY C. CHAPMAN
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     U.S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
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     Hearing re: Doc. #46785 Four Hundred Eighty-Third Omnibus
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     Objection to Claims (No Liability claims)
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     Hearing re: Doc #47101 Four Hundred Eighty-Eighth Omnibus
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     Objection to Claims (No Liability Claims)
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     Hearing re: Adv. 13-01719 - Doc #20 Motion to Dismiss
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     Counts II, III & IV of Plaintiffs Complaint
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     Transcribed by: Dawn South, Debra McCostlin, and Sheila
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Page 6 1 PROCEEDINGS 2 THE COURT: How is everyone today? (A chorus of good morning) 3 THE COURT: We had a rare break of sun yesterday, 4 5 so I had to shield the witness from the sun, but we're going 6 to open it up. 7 All right. Who would like to start? 8 MR. MILLER: Good morning, Your Honor. 9 THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Miller. 10 MR. MILLER: May it please the Court, I'm Ralph 11 Miller from Weil, Gotshal & Manges here for the plan 12 administrator, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. or LBHI, and 13 the other Chapter 11 estates that are sued in this rather 14 broad claim or the claims against. 15 This agenda item deals with the four hundred 16 eighty-third omnibus objection to claims, and specifically 17 with the Stonehill claimants, which are Stonehill Institutional Partners LP and Stonehill Offshore Partners 18 19 Limited. 20 Even if the Court treats all the facts as true 21 that are asserted in the Stonehill claims themselves, 22 together with all the facts that are asserted in the Stonehill response to the four hundred and eight-third 23 24 objection, no claim is stated for relief. 25 The Stonehill claims all arise from prime

brokerage agreements that contain only performance obligations of Lehman Brothers Inc., that is LBI.

As the objection and reply of the plan
administrator have shown, the central contract claim of
Stonehill cannot impose any liability on E debtors in this
Chapter 11 case for a number of reasons, and each of
Stonehill's creative efforts to plead a tort claim related
to that alleged breach of the prime brokerage contract has a
series of reasons why those tort claims also are
insufficient.

I'd like to start with the nature of the loss asserted and then talk about the simplest reasons that both the central contract claim and the add-on tort claims fail, and then there are layers of reasons that these claims are defective, and in the interest of brevity I will summarize some of those, but I'd like to reserve some time if they are raised in the response and talk about them specifically.

Let me talk about the claim and issue first, which is important. We need to start by being clear about what the claim is, and it's stated in paragraph 9 of the attachment to each proof of claim. And the first sentence reads in a way that contains three critical facts, and if I might take a moment and put that in the record.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. MILLER: Paragraph 9 says:

"In addition the debtor and Lehman entities are obligated to claimant for damages, interest, costs, attorneys' fees, including, but not limited to, the amount respecting the diminution in value of the securities held by LBI under the PD agreement from the date in which LBI's SIPA proceeding was commenced through the date that such securities were returned to claimant."

This is the only place there's any specificity
that I can find about the mechanism that is said to have
caused the loss. There are some allegations that because
they didn't have these claims they had some foreign exchange
losses and they had some attorneys' fees and they had some
diminution of value, but the essence of the claim is that
during the period of time from the filing the SIPA
proceeding under the return of securities they didn't have
access to their securities.

THE COURT: So for shorthand we'll call this the diminution claim?

MR. MILLER: That's fine, Your Honor, I think that's fair. Again, I suppose a foreign exchange may not technically be a diminution exactly, but --

THE COURT: Okay. Can I just ask you just a threshold question, because there's a lot of aspects of this, and I appreciate your trying to -- simplify is not the right word -- but categorize, if you will. And maybe this

Pg 9 of 205 Page 9 1 is a little bit of a softball for you, but here it comes. 2 How would this be different -- in your view the claim that Stonehill is seeking to assert, the diminution 3 claim, how would it be different from the same claim that 4 5 every other customer of the prime brokerage firm had for 6 diminution of the securities? 7 Stated differently, if Stonehill has this claim 8 doesn't every customer of LBI have this claim if its 9 securities were diminished? MR. MILLER: Well certainly, Your Honor, any 10 11 holder that had a portfolio of complex securities is going 12 to have some of these costs that they are asserting. I 13 suppose, Your Honor, to be completely candid it's possible 14 that if somebody had a -- had Apple stock and they were just 15 going to leave it sitting there and the Apple stock just 16 went up and up and up --17 THE COURT: Sure. No, I'm assuming --18 MR. MILLER: -- and they got it back --THE COURT: -- I'm assuming diminution. 19 20 MR. MILLER: Yes. 21 THE COURT: I'm assuming diminution. 22 MR. MILLER: If there was a diminution and if there were foreign exchange effects, if there was interest 23

cost, if there was something they could show that they did

because they didn't have access to their securities of

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Page 10 1 course. This is something everybody would have, and frankly 2 this would basically be a way around the SIPA proceeding to all the affiliates of --3 THE COURT: So -- right. So now you're getting to 4 5 the heart of my question, which I guess is more -- should be 6 more direct than at Mr. Brilliant. 7 So there aren't a spool of these asserted or let 8 alone allowed claims at the debtors other than LBI. 9 MR. MILLER: Well, I think that's true, Your 10 Honor, and you're going to hear one in a few minutes that is 11 -- that has some similarity --12 THE COURT: Yes. 13 MR. MILLER: -- to this one, Your Honor, and there have been some other prime brokerage claims, but I think 14 15 these are among the very few that are left, as I understand 16 it. Maybe Mr. Fail --17 THE COURT: Mr. Fail? 18 MR. MILLER: -- can clarify the numbers. MR. FAIL: Yes, Your Honor. These and the new 19 20 court ones are -- that you'll hear later today are the only 21 ones remaining against the Chapter 11 estates, none were 22 allowed against the Chapter 11 estates. THE COURT: And were they simply not pursued or 23 24 where they stricken by Judge Peck after prior hearings on 25 these? Do you know, Mr. Fail?

Page 11 1 MR. FAIL: The vast majority have been -- well, I 2 don't want to say that. There's a combination of withdrawals -- voluntary withdrawals and court orders, but 3 none of a contested. So a number of objections were filed 4 5 and responses were not submitted. 6 THE COURT: Okay. But there was no disposition on 7 the merits of this issue in this case by Judge Peck. 8 MR. FAIL: There was no dispositions on the 9 merits. 10 THE COURT: Okay. 11 MR. FAIL: And one caveat, Your Honor, when I said 12 Chapter 11 estates I referred to -- I meant to refer to 13 other than LBHI there are certain claims outstanding related 14 to guaranteed claims, but --15 THE COURT: Different. 16 MR. FAIL: -- those are contractual based on a 17 guarantee not --18 THE COURT: Different. Right. Okay. MR. FAIL: Thank you. 19 20 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Sorry for the 21 interruption, Mr. Miller. Go ahead. 22 MR. MILLER: And, Your Honor, I think that that is 23 important to bear that in mind. 24 I want to go back to the three key facts from what 25 they do asserting their claim.

Pg 12 of 205 Page 12 First these are about securities held by LBI under the plan agreement. They were held by LBI. There's no allegation here that these securities were ever held by any of the Chapter 11 debtors. THE COURT: But there's a bailee -- there's a bailment allegation. MR. MILLER: There is a bailment, and I'll deal with that --THE COURT: Okay. MR. MILLER: -- Your Honor. We take that as a misreading of the contract, but it also can't be a bailment if the party doesn't hold it. You have to hold the object to be -- to at least have an implied bailment. The second point is that the securities were returned to claimant. They're not saying there was a shortage of securities or the securities were lost or the securities were sent to any of the Chapter 11 debtors and mishandled, any of that. And finally the duration of the claimed loss and value is from the date in which LBI's SIPA proceeding was concerned through the date the securities were returned. So it precisely corresponds with the filing of the SIPA proceeding and it goes through the date that they got them back.

It's important what is not alleged, it is not

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alleged that any of the affiliates ever held, handled, or had the right to hold or handle any of these securities.

And it's not alleged that there were any damages before the SIPA proceeding was commenced. It's not alleged that LBHI or any of its affiliates ever received any benefit from holding these securities over this period of time.

Now let me talk a little bit about the simplest way to resolve these claims, which is the broad force majeure clause in paragraph -- Section 29 of both agreements.

As summarized in our papers and with some ellipses it exculpates all the Chapter 11 estates from "any loss caused directly or indirectly by government restrictions ... suspension of trading ... or other conditions beyond Lehman Brothers' control." This is virtually identical to the clause and a similar clause considered by Judge Glenn in MF Global. He properly found that clause was triggered by a SIPA proceeding because the alleged damages as here flowed directly or indirectly from government restriction or suspension of trading.

Now there are some factual differences within that --

THE COURT: Right. So that was -- the SIPA proceeding was the debtor.

MR. MILLER: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: But here the SIPA proceeding is the affiliate.

MR. MILLER: The SIPA -- it was in the SIPA proceeding, but that actually I think makes this claim harder, because in that instance that entity did have it, and the allegation was that the SIPA entity there had been grossly negligent and had willful misconduct and had breached the contract by letting itself go broke basically was the allegation. And that was under Illinois law, but we cite cases on page 10 of our reply that say that Illinois law is not materially different from New York law. And the claimant did set up its gross negligence and willful misconduct allegations a little differently here.

Here there is an effort to plead fraud, and I'll talk about that directly, we don't think that pleading is adequate, but it doesn't work in any event we think to get around it had restriction.

Your Honor, if you think about force majeure clauses, I mean this clause covered things like terrorism and war, and there's always going to be some allegation that an entity that has a terrorist attack could have had better security or that something could have been done that might have prevented or that the parties that were doing business with the business should have been warned that they were exposed to a terrorist attack or something else, these broad

force majeure clauses are designed to deal with a category of loss and not a specific cause of that loss. This includes things like nuclear war.

So in essence a SIPA proceeding is the equivalent of a war event in this instance, there's just no ability for anybody else to deal with those securities while SIPA has them tied up and they're in control of the court.

So we think that Judge Glenn properly recognized that that clause included willful misconduct and gross negligence, and frankly we think the same would be true if there were fraud that induced a party to continue to do business, which is essentially what their allegation is here. All of those are contributing causes, but it's not about the cause, it's about the category of loss.

So we think that is the simple answer and it takes care of everything.

They do argue that their claim is based on prepetition actions with LBHI, but whether that's true or not the losses that resulted were directly or indirectly caused by government restrictions, suspension of trading, or other conditions beyond Chapter 11 debtor's control.

Now Stonehill says that --

THE COURT: So even if -- just to focus on that last point.

MR. MILLER: Yeah.

THE COURT: So even if prepetition, pre-SIPA, August into September of 2008 there was a very full record beyond what's alleged now, a very full record of meetings and conversations and specific promises and showing of numbers -- I'm making this up -- even if there was a record that Stonehill had been actively and affirmatively reassured and led to stay put, not as a fraud claim, but that wouldn't -- it would not have an affect on the effectiveness -preclusive effectiveness of the force majeure clause, right? MR. MILLER: I think that's right, Your Honor. THE COURT: I mean that's what you're telling me. MR. MILLER: Certainly unless the assurance was there's no way you'll ever lose even a moment of access to your security, don't worry about that, we promise -- I mean this is a question of misrepresentation -- well even if there's a SIPA proceeding trading will continue. I mean you could --THE COURT: You could come --MR. MILLER: -- concoct some very specific things. THE COURT: Right. MR. MILLER: But if the assurance was this broker/dealer is regulated, its got lots of money, you've got protection from SIPA, you will get your securities back, that all turned out to be true. The only thing that happened was there was a delay in being able to get the

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securities back.

So all of these assurances about liquidity and about the operations turned out in a sense to be true.

There was enough liquidity, everybody's securities came back to them, nobody lost any securities. And parts of the broker/dealer continued to function through the sale of Barclays.

went away, what happened was there was a delay, and there's no allegation that anybody ever said there will never be any delay. I mean, you know, you don't have to worry about it, you'll always have your securities, everything will continue smoothly. The allegation is that there were statements that there was certain amounts of liquidity and basically it was the intention of keep doing business. And I'll explain, even if you didn't have this exculpation clause -- or I really think this is a force majeure clause and there's another exculpation clause in Section 30 -- but --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. MILLER: -- even if you didn't have Section 29 or Section 30 I don't think the allegations here of tort or contract work -- and I'd like to talk about that briefly now.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. MILLER: So -- but I think the force majeure

clause is a simple complete answer, and I think Judge Glenn applied it broadly, and I think his approach to that clause where he said, look, hanging tort allegations around it or saying there were torts before or torts after doesn't change the fact that the category of loss was in -- between sophisticated parties was excluded from recovery. And I notice the point is made that SIPA also precludes this kind of recovery. I mean it's statutory. So that's consistent with something in the SIPA proceeding. That's consistent with something that Congress did.

Now there's also a limitation of liability clause in paragraph 30. It expressly excludes gross negligence or willful misconduct. That is there's a critical difference though because it's much broader in terms of the actions, and it deals with categories of actions that include "execution, clearing, handling, purchasing, or selling securities, commodities, or other property, or other action except for gross negligence or willful misconduct." So it basically is a very broad exculpatory clause, and it covers any action whether it was beyond the control or not beyond the control.

So there's a real qualitative difference and that's the reason there are indifferent provisions, and Judge Glenn did not -- there's a similar two clause arrangement in MF Global, he didn't import the gross

Pg 19 of 205 Page 19 negligence or willful misconduct as an expectation to the other clause. It's not in Section 29, it's only in Section 30. THE COURT: Well that supports --MR. MILLER: Yes. THE COURT: That seems to support your characterization of the first as a force majeure and the second as a more ordinary exculpation. MR. MILLER: Yes. One is sort of broad and thin and the other one is very narrow and deep, Your Honor. The first one is very narrowly defined to certain things that I think -- traditionally in law school when I was there they call those acts of God, but things that are pretty much beyond human control to some extent, and that includes the government deciding that somebody has to shut down and locking down its assets. So again, we think that that takes care of everything. But even if Section 29 did not exist these claims are still insufficient. And let me start with some of the imaginative contract theories. First of all Stonehill says that the reference to Lehman Brothers and the broad definition makes LBHI and other affiliates jointly and severely liable, which is by the way more of a tort concept than a contract concept.

The only provision that it posts a duty to hold

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and return securities however is paragraph 21 of the PB agreement, and it imposes duties only on LBI, and indeed the Court can take judicial notice of the fact that only LBI is licensed to hold and trade and deal with securities. The other Chapter 11 debtors were not licensed as broker/dealers.

New York law is clear, as stated in the Abundance Partners case that we cite on page 10, that "where the plain language of a contract signed by multiple parties indicates that only one party has assumed an obligation, only that party will be held liable for a failure to perform." There are other cases that say the same thing. The multiple party allegation only works if it looks like all the parties agreed to perform the whole contract, and here clearly the prime brokerage functions were broken out.

Now, there's also an allegation by Stonehill that somehow LBHI should be jointly and severely liable because it received a benefit from the PB agreement because it was the parent corporation of LBI. Well this of course just jumps over the whole alter ego doctrine and says, well, gosh, if you might have gotten a dividend from this benefit, from this business you're liable for all these contracts. They cite no law and there is no law.

Now let me talk about the bailee argument. It's interesting.

It is first of all based on a misreading of a clause and contract. What the contract clause really says, Your Honor, is that LBI holds as a bailee for the benefit of other Lehman entities.

As the examiner found, and Stonehill admitted, the purpose of this kind of clause was to protect Lehman entities who were owed money by a brokerage customer by allowing them to treat those securities held by LBI as a form of collateral. Basically it was a cross-collateralization arrangement. So (indiscernible) got a loan from LBCC or some LBDP or one of the other entities that was in the banking business and they had securities, LBI was holding for their benefit and they could claim on it.

Now Stonehill reads this clause backwards, it tries to say this makes LBHI a bailee for the benefit of the brokerage customer, which is not the way the clause reads. And so it says at least it's an implied bailor. But the admitted facts are here that LBI was the only entity that held securities. There's -- as I said, there's no allegation that any other entity held it, and we cite cases in our brief, our reply on page 13 for the clear proposition under New York law that there can be no bailment without possession by the bailee.

THE COURT: So this fits into the category of LBHI

Page 22 1 has a relationship in which its counterparty is obligated to 2 post collateral. 3 MR. MILLER: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: LBHI can't hold the securities. 4 5 MR. MILLER: Yes, Your Honor. 6 THE COURT: LBHI turns around to LBI and says, 7 here, hold these securities for us as our agent or as our --8 MR. MILLER: I think what it really says is that 9 LBI holds the securities as a bailee and it holds it as a 10 bailee, but the beneficiary of that bailment is not just the 11 bailor, but also other entities. In other words one can 12 post a bailment --13 THE COURT: But not the counterparty to the -- but not the counterparty --14 15 MR. MILLER: Right. 16 THE COURT: -- whose securities they actually are. 17 MR. MILLER: It doesn't say that -- it would be like an escrow agent. 18 19 THE COURT: Right. 20 MR. MILLER: Let's say that two parties to a real 21 estate contract put money into escrow and the contract says 22 that the escrow agent holds as the bailee for both the buyer 23 and the seller, and under the circumstances that does not 24 make the buyer or it does not make -- yes, it doesn't make 25 the buyer who maybe a beneficiary of this money in escrow a

Pg 23 of 205 Page 23 bailee or the seller. It means that it is a beneficiary of the bailment, that's really what's happened here --THE COURT: Got it. MR. MILLER: -- mechanically, I believe, Your Honor. So, I think again, creative, but it doesn't fit the facts. Now, there's also an agency allegation, and this is really another way around alter ego. The conclusory allegation that "LBHI had the ability to influence and control LBI, its wholly-owned subsidiary, as well as other Lehman entities, including with respect to the Lehman entities' obligations under the prime brokerage agreement." Now again, that's just to say that would make parent corporations liable for every contract of their subsidiaries and subsidiaries of subsidiaries if that were the law. They don't have any cases for it. It doesn't work. There's a UCC claim that has to do with failing to hold securities in an account that is protected from other creditors, and this is again creative, it doesn't have anything to do delay and returning securities, it has to do with making sure the securities were returned. Here the

securities were returned. And again, there's no indication

that LBHI or any of the others could do anything to make

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sure what account LBI used to hold these securities. So the UCC claim doesn't add anything.

Again, all of these contracts claims are also resolved by your Section 29 or 30, which they would be actions, and if they got the wrong account it wouldn't necessarily be willful misconduct or gross negligence. So they're also swept up by Section 30, the broad exculpatory language.

Now let's talk about the tort claims.

There are two events. There was an earnings call on September 10th and an alleged conversation of Mr. John Wickham, whose employer is not clearly identified by Stonehill, and we'll come back to that in a moment. LBHI has shown that the September 10, 2008 earnings call had extensive disclaimers and cautionary language, that's in paragraph 55 of the objection. Stonehill has not responded at least that I could find to the argument that this language eliminated reasonable reliances as a matter of law. We think it did. It was future events, it turned out to be wrong, they didn't plan to go into Chapter 11 a few days later, and they certainly didn't plan for the SIPA proceeding to happen on the 19th. But that's not actionable because reliance on that was not reasonable.

Now, Mr. Wickham made certain statements that are -- and they're outlined in paragraph 39 really of their

response, and just to outline what they say about this.

They -- and they talk about the intent, and I want to suggest to you that this is first of all fraud by hindsight, and second, it does not plead specific intent for Mr. Wickham.

What they say is the proofs of claim allege that Lehman Brothers' "misrepresentations were intended to convince Lehman Brothers' customers and counterparties in general and SCM in particular of the financial stability and health of Lehman Brothers despite the fact that Lehman Brothers' officers knew or should have known that there were substantial risks that Lehman Brothers liquidity and capital may not continue to support its operations." That the

Then they say, skipping a citation in paragraph 40:

operations, that's what they allege.

liquidity and capital may not continue to support its

"The proofs of claim further allege that only a few days after Lehman Brothers' direct misrepresentation to SCM regarding Lehman Brothers' liquidity and financial condition 'the debtor commenced its Chapter 11 case and LBI commenced its SIPA proceeding.'"

Well, Your Honor, this is classic fraud by hindsight. Some good things were said at some point and then a bad thing happened, therefore you must have known

this bad thing was going happen and you must have lied to us about it, or otherwise, you know, the bad thing would not have happened, you had to know it was coming. That does not under any kind of pleading, and certainly under rule 9, which we belief does apply to allegations of fraud as well as allegations of gross negligence, we don't think that that raises either an allegation of falsity sufficiently, or more importantly, Your Honor, it doesn't allege adequately the intent of the speaker for fraud.

An element of fraud is that the speaker knew or was reckless in knowing that the statement was false when made. And although intent can be pleaded generally, there has to be a motive that is clearly pleaded at that time, and there must be more than the motive that the speaker wanted to do things that business people always want to do like earn fees or make a profit.

And so even if we treat the response as a supplement, this is fatally deficient to allege that Mr. Wickham had knowledge that his alleged statements were false or had a motive to mislead. And I'd like to cite two cases that I think are not in our brief that I've since come cross that I think deal with this well. One is the Wori, W-O-R-I Bank versus RBS Securities case, 910 F.Supp.2d 697, Southern District of New York 2012. It says:

"A general statement of knowledge under Rule 9

requires either one, a showing that the defendant had a motive and opportunity to commit fraud, or two, allegations of strong circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness."

Further the plaintiffs cannot cite -- and I'm no longer quoting the case, Your Honor -- but further plaintiffs cannot satisfy the motive requirement "based on motives possessed by virtually all corporate insiders, including ... the appearance of corporate profitability or the success of an investment." And that's a quote actually from Novak, N-O-V-A-K versus Kasaks, K-A-S-A-K-S, 216 F.3d 300 at 307, Second Circuit 2000.

The Wori bank case that I just cited at page 703 has a similar quotation. It says, "A general profit motive such as the motive to earn fees ... is not sufficient to show fraud."

It would go to the specifics in the claim and the response what Stonehill alleges as motive is "the purpose of these representations was to induce Stonehill to refrain from demanding the returns of its assets held by LBI and other Lehman entities and otherwise taking actions to promptly reduce its commercial exposure to Lehman Brothers" at a time when the senior executives of Lehman Brothers knew the enterprise was on the verge of collapse.

Again, Your Honor, this is merely an allegation

that they were being encouraged to keep doing business, and that does not have the necessary motive and intent allegation under Rule 9 to allege fraud.

Now, it's important also another defect in terms of this fraud pleading, is that Stonehill does not say which executives it's talking about, and it's not offering any allegation that John Wickham specifically knew the enterprise was on the verge of collapse. This is the problem with group pleading of fraud.

Under Rule 9, which again we believe and cite cases that does apply, you can't just say a bunch of people had certain knowledge and certain of those people made some statements and therefore there's a fraud. You have to say the people making the statement knew the fraud.

We cite a number of cases in our reply that a group allegation of fraud without an identification of which entity committed the fraud is insufficient, and there are no specific allegations that Mr. Wickham himself had knowledge his statements were false. This is clearly a group pleading about Lehman Brothers' executives generally, it also does not identify which debtor. They just sued a myriad of Chapter 11 debtors.

When you put this together, Your Honor, even if you didn't have the force majeure clause, which we think takes care of it, Stonehill has not asserted a tort case

that can rise to the level of gross negligence or willful misconduct or fraud. And I might add that it has not alleged the kind of gross negligence or willful misconduct facts having to do with -- or a reckless disregard of the truth or the like.

So -- and we think by that way that chapter -- paragraph 30 of the prime brokerage agreement takes care of negligent misrepresentation.

And there's also an interesting little duty problem they have with neglect misrepresentation, because they don't allege who Mr. Wickham worked with they either have, as we believe the facts would show, but we don't have them in the record, that Mr. Wickham was an LBI employee in which case that wouldn't be the problem with these debtors, or if Mr. Wickham did have something to do or had worked for LBHI he didn't have any duty to them. This would be in essence asking a stranger for opinions.

I don't think those are the facts, but the fact is if you go in the Apple store and ask an Apple employee do you think I ought to buy Apple stock and he says to some customer, yeah, I have it myself, and the guy goes out and buys Apple stock and tries to sue Apple, the answer that the customer was just walking in -- or perspective customer just walks in off the street, asks somebody for directions on the street, is 6th Avenue over there and they give you the wrong

Page 30 1 directions you can't sue them. So if Mr. Wickham actually 2 worked for another entity they didn't have a -- weren't -didn't have a special relationship with. And they get back 3 to this bailment story is their special relationship. 4 They 5 don't have any duty for negligent misrepresentation as well. 6 I think that's a technical point. 7 THE COURT: You're also asserting that any 8 reliance was not reasonable, right? 9 MR. MILLER: Yes, Your Honor, absolutely. 10 THE COURT: Separate argument, right? 11 MR. MILLER: Separate argument, Your Honor. 12 we think -- essentially they have not pleaded any of the 13 elements adequately, or as a matter of law when you look at 14 the facts and take out the conclusory allegations, they have 15 to use words like misrepresented, they don't -- they have to 16 have facts to meet Rule 9, and they do do who, what, when, 17 and where, but they don't do why or what the person knew, 18 and they don't do intent and they don't do reasonable 19 They don't have all the elements that they would reliance. 20 need. 21 Now finally, Your Honor --22 THE COURT: So let me give you another --23 MR. MILLER: Yeah. 24 THE COURT: -- hypothetical. 25 MR. MILLER: Yes, Your Honor.

Page 31 1 THE COURT: Purely hypothetical, obviously. 2 I think everybody our age can recall early September in 2008 what it was like. 3 MR. MILLER: 4 Yes. 5 THE COURT: Hypothetically if over Labor Day 6 weekend, you know, Mr. Fold had gathered everybody in and 7 said get on the phone, get on the phone, the only way we're 8 going to, you know, gather this is if everybody gets out 9 there and keeps everybody from taking their capital out, 10 right? Get on the -- work those phones. Hypothetical. 11 MR. MILLER: Hypothetical, yes, Your Honor. 12 THE COURT: Okay? Hypothetical. And then that --13 and then they went and there was the Wickham phone call 14 pursuant to my hypothetical. 15 MR. MILLER: Yes, Your Honor. 16 THE COURT: I think what you're telling me is 17 nonetheless the reliance on the Apple store like 18 reassurance, our liquidity is strong, life is good, stick 19 with us would not have been reasonable. 20 MR. MILLER: We believe that's true, Your Honor. It's also important to understand that they did 21 22 not allege that as to --THE COURT: Well, I said it was a hypothetical. 23 24 MR. MILLER: -- what Mr. Wickham said. 25 That's why I said it was a THE COURT:

Page 32 1 hypothetical, and I'm not trying to make suggestions to 2 Mr. Brilliant on how to improve his pleading, I'm just --3 I'm trying to understand kind of the --MR. MILLER: I know. 4 THE COURT: -- scope of the legal argument, and I think the legal argument is that reliance on those 7 statements, even if all that stuff had happened that I just 8 made up or not, just wasn't reasonable. MR. MILLER: It was not, Your Honor, and it would 10 have been reliance on essentially assurance of future 11 performance. 12 It also feeds neatly into a doctrine that I want to talk about in a moment, which is that a duplicative 13 14 assertion that a party is going to perform a contract doesn't give rise to a tort in New York law. But let me go 15 16 back for just a minute to what the allegation is about 17 Mr. Wickham, because it's really thin. 18 If you look at --THE COURT: It's paragraph 13. MR. MILLER: -- paragraphs 13 and 14. 21 THE COURT: Right. 22 MR. MILLER: Yes, Your Honor. If you've already 23 looked at it, this is apparently what the testimony would 24 be. 25 During a phone call held in early September 2008,

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shortly before the Lehman Chapter 11 filing, Mr. John Wickham, believed to be head of Lehman Brothers Global Client Services, which again is very vague, and acting as a representative of the Lehman entities -- again, there's no facts to support that other than believed to be -- called John Motulsky of SCM in response to Mr. Motulsky's voicemail message to Alex Kirk -- so this was a response -- believed to be a senior officer of LBHI asking about the Lehman entities' financial stability specifically in connection of Lehman entities' prime brokerage and other commercial relationships with claimant and its affiliates.

Paragraph 14:

"In response to questions and concerns expressed by Mr. Motulsky regarding the Lehman entities' financial strength and viability, Mr. Wickham sought to reassure claimant through SCM and Mr. Motulsky regarding the Lehman entities' financial condition and the stability of its prime brokerage operation.

Mr. Motulsky recalls that Mr. Wickham stated that
Lehman had adequate liquidity, because unlike Vera Stearns
(ph), they prudently financed its customers with matched
funds and had sufficient liquidity from sources it believed
to be reliable to meet all of its obligations for a year,
even if no financing was available, that it had 12 billion
surplus cash and also cited the ability of secured financing

from the federal reserve, none of which was used."

Let me stop right there, Your Honor. All of those facts could be completely true, they don't allege they're false, they just say there was then a SIPA proceeding, that's all they say. So there's no allegation that any of that is not true.

Then it goes on, paragraph 15 and it says:

"Mr. Motulsky also recalls that Mr. Wickham stated that Lehman's unrealized depreciation in various assets, one of which was Neuberger Berman, half of which Mr. Wickham stated might soon be sold at a profit to realize value and edit to tangible equity, were more than sufficient to cover possible unrealized losses in its portfolio and provide incremental equity that would be required for a plan spin out of most of Lehman's commercial real estate portfolio, and conveyed a message to Lehman Brothers' prime brokerage operations would continue operating in the normal course."

It says here conveyed a message that, and the claimant should be comfortable continuing its customer and counterparty relationship with Lehman Brothers.

And then it says a few days after this conversation the debtor commenced the Chapter 11 case.

But, Your Honor, again, that's -- there's two categories of allegations. Some of those are future hopes, representations, and beliefs, and you can't reasonably rely

on any of that. And the rest of that stuff is not alleged to be untrue. And the fact that they got all their securities back, in fact it's consistent with the central theme of this, none of this says there is no possibility that you'll ever have any break in your trading or that the SIPA proceeding won't cause you a problem.

So, again, Your Honor, I think the way this is pleaded it simply does not rise to the level of meeting Rule 9.

Now finally, Your Honor, there is a doctrine in New York that tort claims cannot be asserted if they are duplicative of contract claims. Now these cases are cited, among other places, on page 30 of our reply, the doctrine applies perfectly here, because the tort claims of Stonehill are merely contingents that Stonehill treated the earnings call and the statements of Mr. Wickham as assurances that LBI would perform the PB agreement. And when a party says I promise to do this in writing in a contract and somebody calls them up and says you're still going to come out and do this contract aren't you, and they say, yeah, I'm still planning to come out and do it, then they don't do it, you have a breach of contract, you don't have fraud on top of the breach of contract. Otherwise every time somebody breaches a contract, since almost always the contract has other assurances, scheduling, all the rest of this, you get

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a whole tort case on top of a contract case. And in this that's what they're trying to do.

Stonehill footnote about whether this doctrine applies if there's no valid contract. These cases really stand for the proposition that if the tort claim is not duplicative of a promise in the contract, if somebody has a contract with a guy to do plumbing and he comes out and misrepresents something about the foundation of their house, the fact that there was a plumbing contract doesn't excuse -- doesn't apply to this doctrine.

There's also an economic loss doctrine which we cite in our brief, and that really has to do with concept.

That if the loss is the same as the breach of the contract then hanging torts around it by negligent misrepresentation doesn't increase the claim.

In summary, Your Honor, this is creative, it's interesting, but it's just not a set of claims that work with this contract and the facts that we have with the Court and we think they're insufficient.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Miller.

MR. MILLER: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. BRILLIANT: Can I have one moment, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Sure.

(Pause)

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1	MR. BRILLIANT: Good morning, Your Honor.
2	THE COURT: Good morning. How are you?
3	MR. BRILLIANT: Good. Thank you, Your Honor.
4	So, I guess this hearing was a long time coming,
5	you know, two snowstorm delays and
6	THE COURT: Was it
7	MR. BRILLIANT: we're finally here.
8	THE COURT: I've just I've lost track.
9	MR. BRILLIANT: Right. But your chambers was very
10	good about rescheduling. We appreciate that, Your Honor.
11	THE COURT: They always are.
12	MR. BRILLIANT: That's absolutely true.
13	THE COURT: Especially my colleague sitting to my
14	left.
15	MR. BRILLIANT: Your Honor, I'm sure you can
16	tell Your Honor has read, you know, the briefs and
17	understand the issues.
18	THE COURT: Sure. Sure.
19	MR. BRILLIANT: You know, it's what I'd like to
20	do is just kind of give you a little bit of the statements
21	to what we're here about, because I think, you know,
22	Mr. Miller didn't really talk about that.
23	THE COURT: Well we're here on a sufficiency
24	hearing.
25	MR. BRILLIANT: We're here on a sufficiency

1 hearing, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yeah. I got all that.

MR. BRILLIANT: And we're here -- right. And we're here on a -- I know you know that, I don't think there's going to be a lot I'm going to tell you today, Your Honor, that you don't know. It's very clear to me you're very well prepared for the hearing. But we're here on a sufficiency hearing. But we're here on a sufficiency hearing in connection with a proof of claim. We're not here on a sufficiency hearing in connection with a complaint, and most of the cases, especially with respect to, you know, 9(d) that are -- you know, that are cited by Mr. Miller all deal with complaints.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. BRILLIANT: And as Your Honor knows the Second Circuit in the, you know, the Aetna, you know, case, the Shadow, you know, Gay case, you know, there, you know, Judge Lifland had dismissed, you know, the allegation for setoff, you know, on the basis of pleading in a proof of claim, it went up to the District Court, it was affirmed, and the Second Circuit said, no, a burden of proof of claim just needs to state, you know, that you're -- what the nature of the claim is and if you seek to hold the debtor liable. The proof of claim --

THE COURT: Right, but I think the --

MR. BRILLIANT: -- the proof of claim did that.

THE COURT: Right. I think I can help you out though, because here on top of whatever, you know, the law is, we've got this procedure, right, so that given that the proof of claim got filed and then we lay it on that procedure you might make the argument, I think it would be a good one, that even if you have to satisfy the standard and plead with particularity, ala (sic) 9(b), you should have an opportunity to do that, because the order of things in this case didn't put you on notice that you had to do that, right?

MR. BRILLIANT: That's right, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So that -- and Mr. Miller didn't address that. I mean his arguments at the podium were all addressed to what -- you know, the merits.

MR. BRILLIANT: That's right, Your Honor, and I think you're absolutely right about that, Your Honor. I mean obviously to the extent somehow there was some determination that 9(b) somehow applies because they filed an objection then clearly that would be, you know, putting a retroactive, you know, pleading requirement on a party, which obviously violates due process, and you know, the Second Circuit says in any event even if we had filed the complaint here, you know, the right to replead, you know, should be, you know, given freely.

So we would expect -- you know, from a worse case perspective that Your Honor should allow that, but I think we -- I don't think, Your Honor, we need to get there today.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BRILLIANT: Because we filed a proof of claim, and the question is whether it's sufficient.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. BRILLIANT: And we think with respect to, you know, the fraud allegations we have alleged more than enough, you know, in terms of the who, the what, the when, you know, and the reliance, you know, and the damages.

But I think let me just step back for a second,

Your Honor. So, I think we all understand, you know, what

we're here about, it's a sufficiency hearing in connection

with a proof of claim, and then -- and there's two different

types -- as Your Honor knows there's two different types of

claims asserted here. There's the contract claim, you know,

and the tort claims.

And -- but when -- you know, listening to your colloquy with Mr. Miller it's clear that their view is that by virtue of the exculpation provisions, you know, contained in the contract that a broker/dealer, leaving aside the issue of, you know, the different entities here, that a broker/dealer on the eve of insolvency is free to lie to all of its customers to get them to keep their securities in

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1	there knowing that they will suffer, you know, loss, you
2	know, after, you know, a bankruptcy filing, and that they
3	can just defraud people, and that the provisions of the
4	exculpation, which say, you know, their view, I don't agree
5	with their view, that you know, that a force majeure, any
6	damages caused by you know, they view, you know, a SIPA
7	proceeding to be a force majeure. We don't agree with that.
8	But
9	THE COURT: But so let's go right to it. So how
10	do you distinguish, putting aside
11	MR. BRILLIANT: Uh-huh.
12	THE COURT: your tort claim.
13	MR. BRILLIANT: Right.
14	THE COURT: Just on the contract claim how do you
15	distinguish our facts from MF Global?
16	MR. BRILLIANT: Putting aside, you're saying
17	THE COURT: Putting aside the tort claim.
18	MR. BRILLIANT: Right.
19	THE COURT: Right.
20	MR. BRILLIANT: Okay.
21	THE COURT: Just what you said was
22	MR. BRILLIANT: Yes.
23	THE COURT: you know, on the eve
24	MR. BRILLIANT: Yes.
25	THE COURT: of a SIPA proceeding

	Page 42
1	MR. BRILLIANT: Yes.
2	THE COURT: our broker/dealers
3	MR. BRILLIANT: Yes.
4	THE COURT: are free to lie.
5	MR. BRILLIANT: Yes.
6	THE COURT: Similar allegations were made in MF
7	Global, and I think and you can disagree with me I
8	asked Mr. Miller the question, well isn't MF Global
9	different because that was the debtor
10	MR. BRILLIANT: Uh-huh.
11	THE COURT: was the SIPA the entity that
12	MR. BRILLIANT: Yes.
13	THE COURT: filed, and here basically
14	Mr. Miller said, well, that's our case is a force majeure
15	to that because that was the debtor, this was
16	MR. BRILLIANT: Yes.
17	THE COURT: one step removed.
18	MR. BRILLIANT: Yes.
19	THE COURT: So basic question is, you know, help
20	me out of MB Global
21	MR. BRILLIANT: Right.
22	THE COURT: because I find MF Global frankly
23	very persuasive and on point.
24	MR. BRILLIANT: Uh-huh. Okay.
25	THE COURT: Okay?

Pg 43 of 205 Page 43 1 MR. BRILLIANT: So, I think as Your Honor points 2 out, MF Global deals with the contract claim, not the tort 3 claim. THE COURT: Yes. 4 5 MR. BRILLIANT: But starting out with I think 6 there's three really important differences. 7 THE COURT: Okay. MR. BRILLIANT: One is the one that you asked 8 Mr. Miller about, which is the fact in MF Global only dealt 9 10 with the SIPA entity. 11 THE COURT: SIPA, right. MR. BRILLIANT: Not the other entities. And with 12 respect to SIPA policy the policy was you just get back your 13 14 securities, there's not a policy for other claims. And 15 that's -- and we -- you know, the MF Global opinion really 16 deals with a whole litany of different claimants who raised, 17 you know, different issues, the vast majority of the claimants that are dealt with are claimants who asserted 18 claims other than just for the return of their securities in 19 20 the SIPA proceeding, and Judge Glenn goes into, you know, a 21 lengthy analysis of the policies of SIPA, which are 22 different in a Chapter 11 case. So the first thing is that issue and his 23

application of the force majeure provision, you know, that

dealt with, you know, the SIPA policies and applying it in

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Page 44 1 the SIPA proceeding. So that's the first issue. 2 The second, you know, issue here is that the force 3 majeure provision is very different. There one of the issues in the -- you know, one of the litany of things that 4 were listed was specifically, you know, court orders. 5 6 was a much broader force majeure provision which included, 7 you know, language that was broader, you know, than the 8 language that was included in this one. And in our 9 particular force majeure provision, you know, it doesn't 10 pick up, you know, this type of issue. 11 THE COURT: Can we look at it together? 12 MR. BRILLIANT: Sure. 13 (Pause) 14 THE COURT: I'm trying to find it. MR. BRILLIANT: So we're on page -- paragraph 29 15 16 in the --17 THE COURT: In the response? MR. BRILLIANT: Well, I was going to go through 18 19 the contract and then I'm going to pull up the case as well 20 and read the two. But looking at paragraph, you know, 29, 21 which is the extraordinary events. 22 (Pause) 23 MR. BRILLIANT: But it's government restrictions, 24 exchange or market rulings, suspension of trading, war, you 25 know, whether declared or undeclared terrorist acts,

Page 45 1 insurrection, riots, fires, flooding, strikes, failure of 2 utility services, accidents, adverse weather, other events 3 of nature, including, but not limited to, earth quakes, 4 hurricanes, tornados, or other conditions beyond Lehman 5 Brothers' control. 6 THE COURT: Right. So why doesn't that do it? 7 MR. BRILLIANT: Well --THE COURT: We had a SIPA proceeding, right? 8 9 MR. BRILLIANT: Right. And a SIPA proceeding is 10 not -- well one it's not something outside of their control. 11 The other thing is --12 THE COURT: Well how -- hold on. SIPA -- I think 13 SIPA would disagree with you. SIPA gets to decide when it 14 commences a proceeding. How could Lehman Brothers 15 generically have done anything to affect when SIPA decided 16 to commence a proceeding? 17 MR. BRILLIANT: Well, I guess what -- you know, I 18 mean -- we start with the litany -- Your Honor, it doesn't say SIPA proceeding. So a SIPA proceeding --19 20 THE COURT: Sure. MR. BRILLIANT: -- would either have to be a 21 22 government restriction --23 THE COURT: Suspension of trading. 24 MR. BRILLIANT: -- or a suspension of trading. 25 And I guess the question is, is it, you know, suspension --

Page 46 you know, does suspension of trading mean the New York Stock Exchange closed for a day or does it mean, you know, specifically with respect to, you know, this particular --THE COURT: Was LBI able to trade after the SIPA proceeding commenced? MR. BRILLIANT: No, but -- all right. We can turn -- even if -- and I was going to say, even if Your Honor -but the language is different. If you look at the MF Global --THE COURT: Right. MR. BRILLIANT: -- order language, you know, it talks about, you know, orders of courts, and it's more specifically tailored towards these types of issues. But under -- the third issue, Your Honor, and maybe the most important, is under New York law we all know that exculpation provisions, you know, that -- you know, will not be enforced to the extent that the, you know, the damages, you know, result are willful misconduct. THE COURT: Okay. But that's a general public policy argument with respect to limitations of liability, and if you -- and I know that headings in contracts don't mean anything, I don't know if this one specifically has a clause that says so, but we -- the distinction that Mr. Miller draws between the paragraph 29 events and

paragraph 30 events I think has some merit.

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MR. BRILLIANT: Okay. Well, Your Honor, I think that's -- that goes to an issue of damages, you know, what would the -- you know, the -- he's basically saying that damages, you know, that result from things outside, you know, the parties' control --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. BRILLIANT: -- pursuant to this are damages that you can't recover. And I guess from a public policy perspective, I mean that just can't be.

party should be -- you know, should -- you know, a broker/dealer, you know, or its affiliates in this context can do anything they want to do, you know, lie, make misrepresentations, you know, out and out defraud a client, and that if the loss has occurred, in their view directly or indirectly or in part because of, you know, a SIPA proceeding or a government order or something else, that they have no liability for any of those damages, and that just -- in a SIPA proceeding, you know, I understand we're -- you know, why the policies are different there, why Judge Glenn can come to that conclusion. That's not controlling law, it's just precedent, it's on a different agreement -- THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. BRILLIANT: -- in context of the different type of allegation here, but what they're saying is when you

really boil it down, you know, to its assets, they're saying that under New York law a contract will be -- a limitation on liability will be enforced even if the damages are caused, you know, unwillful misconduct and fraud of the party.

THE COURT: But who's the party? You said -- the hypothetical you're setting up is the broker/dealer can do terrible things and then if they've saved by a force majeure event no damages.

Here the allegation is that -- seems to be the allegation that it was somebody acting not in the capacity of an LBI employee but in some other capacity.

MR. BRILLIANT: That's right, Your Honor. That's right. Well, you know, I was using -- if you want to say, you know, broker/dealer, you want to say the -- all of the affiliates of the broker/dealer, but that's right, you know, that -- you know, what they're basically saying is that an employee of, you know, the Lehman entities, you know, Lehman Brothers, let's just say, you know, all right, the Lehman entities can defraud parties, they can, you know, tell you, you know, as we allege here we have the liquidity to get us for an entire year, we don't have any problem, we're going to continue our business in the ordinary course, keep your securities here, you know, you're going to be fine, even though they knew or should have known that they were on the

verge of insolvency in filing bankruptcy. They knew that they had hired -- someone at Lehman Brothers knew that they'd hired bankruptcy counsel. That they had other issues and that the statements they made weren't true.

THE COURT: But this -- now this gets to -- it skips over it, but -- and you can come back to your argument -- but then it gets to the concept that certainly sophisticated market participants and others in that time period they're reading the newspaper and there wasn't a day that went buy where people didn't think, wow, Is Lehman Brothers going to make it? That was -- I mean we could put into the record, you know, the Wall Street Journal, the Financial Press.

MR. BRILLIANT: Uh-huh.

THE COURT: I mean the record would be -- would fill this room of, you know, the doubts and the worries and whatever.

So, you know --

MR. BRILLIANT: Right. But -- right. But the issue of reasonable reliance is not really an issue for today, that's a question of --

THE COURT: No, but it is an issue for today, because Mr. Miller confirmed that part of what Lehman is saying is that as a matter of law, even assuming what -- as true what you alleged, that even more so even assuming that

Page 50 1 you allege my, you know --2 MR. BRILLIANT: Uh-huh. 3 THE COURT: -- (indiscernible) conspiracy --MR. BRILLIANT: Right. 4 5 THE COURT: -- hypothetical --MR. BRILLIANT: Right. 6 7 THE COURT: -- the reliance wasn't reasonable. MR. BRILLIANT: Okay. And I --8 9 THE COURT: And I think I'll ask Mr. Miller on 10 rebuttal, but I think that that's what their position is. 11 MR. BRILLIANT: No, look, I agree that that's 12 their position, and I guess what I'm trying to say, Your 13 Honor, is that's just not, you know, appropriate under the 14 law. You know, the issue of reasonable reliance is a fact-15 based, you know, inquiry. 16 You know, in some of the cases they cite where, 17 you know, they're talking about reasonable reliance on 18 provisions in a prospectus or reasonable reliance in connection with, you know, provisions in a -- you know, in 19 20 an advertisement, you can make arguments of this type. But 21 here where there's a conversation, you know, that occurred 22 that was designed to induce Stonehill to keep their -- and 23 that's the allegation here -- was designed to induce 24 Stonehill to leave its securities, you know, at Lehman 25 Brothers, and there's a -- you know, we'll go on to

paragraph 16 of the attachment -- but with respect to paragraph, you know, 16 where we say these were misrepresentations, you know, and based upon these misrepresentations Stonehill agreed to leave its securities there.

THE COURT: Right. But the other thing that you also say in a footnote I believe -- I think it's in the proof of claim. There's a footnote that says this was -- yes, it's footnote 6 in the proof of claim.

"Many of Mr. Wickham's comments appear to be taken from talking points Mr. Wickham received from the Lehman entities, the communications with customers, rather than being quote/unquote off the cuff remarks of Mr. Wicket's personal views regarding Lehman's financial condition."

so, I think that that rather cuts against your argument and brings me more to the Apple store where generally speaking you're in a distressed situation and you have a crisis PR firm -- again, I'm making it up -- and you have to talking points. Why? Because your phone is going to be ringing off the hook with people who want to know what's happens. So that little footnote kind of cuts the other way. So that's point number one.

MR. BRILLIANT: No --

THE COURT: Point number two that I wanted to ask you at the top and I forgot, was Mr. Miller pointed out that

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	Page 52
1	there was no response to the point about the earnings calls
2	and
3	MR. BRILLIANT: Uh-huh.
4	THE COURT: so the their
5	MR. BRILLIANT: Okay. Well.
6	THE COURT: position is that you've conceded
7	that point.
8	MR. BRILLIANT: No, we've
9	THE COURT: Is that true?
10	MR. BRILLIANT: No. If you look at paragraph 36
11	and 37 of our pleadings we haven't conceded that, and they
12	raise the you know, the (indiscernible) caution rule in
13	their reply, not, you know, up front, and I would like to
14	speak about that, because
15	THE COURT: Okay.
16	MR. BRILLIANT: they applied it
17	inappropriately.
18	THE COURT: Keep going. I'm interrupting you
19	MR. BRILLIANT: No, no.
20	THE COURT: way too much.
21	MR. BRILLIANT: But let me just point one thing
22	out on this reasonable reliance issue
23	THE COURT: Uh-huh.
24	MR. BRILLIANT: first. You know, they cite the
25	Dola (ph) versus Wachnek (ph) case, you know, in their

papers, and there, you know, I believe it cuts against them rather than for them, the court actually found that the plaintiff's complaint adequately pled reasonable reliance for 12(b)(6), and in reasoning the court found:

"Whether or not reliance on alleged
misrepresentations is reasonable in the context of a
particular case is intentionally fact specific and generally
considered inappropriate for determination on a motion to
dismiss"

I think that's right on point here, Your Honor. Your Honor may be able to put yourself, you know, back to right before Lehman Brothers filed and remember that there was a lot of information, you know, swirling around, and think, well gee, you know, well why would somebody, you know, have agreed, you know, to stay, you know, that may -you know, in my mind I can't see how that's reasonable, but you need to wait, you know, on this hearing, you can't just say, you know, that -- you know, it's not plausible that somebody based upon, you know, phone conversations and information, you know, in the public, you know, reasonably, you know, determined, you know, based upon, you know, what we think is well pled here, you know, misrepresentations, you know, agreed to, you know, keep their, you know, securities at Lehman Brothers. So that's a fact-based issue not to be, you know, decided here.

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Page 54 1 Because, you know, although -- you know, I 2 understand there's, you know -- you know, obviously Judge 3 Peck lived the case for a long time before you did, but you're hearing a lot of --4 5 THE COURT: Really? 6 MR. BRILLIANT: -- Lehman Brothers' issues and 7 you're dealing with a lot of different issues over a large 8 time frame. And I understand there's some sense that, you 9 know, that you want to, you know, weigh the different facts 10 or the different allegations and see, but the reality is --11 THE COURT: No, I'm not -- I'm really not 12 interested in getting reversed by the district court for 13 having decided facts in a motion to dismiss. 14 MR. BRILLIANT: Right. THE COURT: So I'm definitely not going to do 15 16 that. 17 MR. BRILLIANT: Right. Okay. Thank you, Your Honor. And it could actually, you know, with the --18 19 THE COURT: But I am interested -- since you've 20 raised kind of the case as a whole -- I'm interested -- and 21 I mean this in the nicest possible way -- I'm interested in 22 the issue of why nobody else was clever enough to have come 23 up with this. 24 MR. BRILLIANT: Yes. You know, I don't think the 25 answer clever enough is really appropriate, Your Honor.

think -- I can't speak for other people because I don't know what damages they had, what claims they filed, why they, you know, decided to withdraw them, what the debtors may have given them with respect to other things in exchange for doing that or how other people, you know, filed their complaint.

All I can tell you is here that, you know,
Stonehill suffered extreme loss of, you know, you've seen
the allegations, \$150 million or more. I can't -- you see
the point. You'd have to add them up. But they suffered
extreme loss here, you know, caused, you know, by the, you
know, the debtor's misconduct and, you know, after being,
you know, in their perspective, you know, fraudulently, you
know, induced to stay, you know, at the company and believe
that they have, you know, valid claims and decided to, you
know, assert them.

The fact that others didn't assert them, I can't really respond to that. Clearly in the MF Global case in the SIPA proceeding, you know, there were, it would appear, hundreds of people who, you know, asserted those types of claims and were, you know, overruled by Judge Glen. You know, why other parties didn't do it, don't know. Don't know if the prime brokerage agreements for other parties were different in light of the fact that Stone -- that Newport has virtually the same one would assume that other

Page 56 1 prime brokerage, you know, clients had similar agreements 2 and could have made, you know, similar arguments. 3 THE COURT: But you have -- Stonehill has an allowed customer claim at Lehman -- at LBI? 4 5 MR. BRILLIANT: They got (indiscernible). 6 THE COURT: They got by this? Good. 7 MR. BRILLIANT: They have other claims that have, you know, been alluded to, you know, that have not been paid 8 9 because the securities, you know, weren't there. FX claims and derivative claims. They have other claims at that 10 11 entity. That's correct. 12 THE COURT: But has a diminution claim been 13 asserted against --14 MR. BRILLIANT: No. 15 THE COURT: -- LBI? 16 MR. BRILLIANT: No. 17 THE COURT: So that's the exact parallel to MF Global, right? 18 19 MR. BRILLIANT: That Judge Klein ruled on, but 20 that's not been asserted there. 21 THE COURT: But what I'm saying is that you have 22 not asserted a diminution claim against LBI. You've 23 asserted a diminution claim against LBHI and other Lehman entities other than LBI. 24 25 MR. BRILLIANT: Let me just -- that's correct,

Your Honor.

THE COURT: So based on what you just said, why haven't you asserted the diminution claim against LBI consistent with your theory that it's all just Lehman Brothers and on the other end of the phone when I'm talking to, you know, whosever talking with them, it's Lehman Brothers, and he's acting on behalf of everybody. So sounds good. Why don't you assert that there's no diminution claim against LBI? I mean, that ship has sailed, right?

MR. BRILLIANT: Well, we're not saying, Your
Honor, that, you know, I guess that's not at issue here
today, right, because Your Honor's not -- we're not here on
the LBI SIPA proceeding and I don't think that the fact that
we didn't assert it against LBI in any way, you know,
prejudices our ability under our theories and we'll go look
at the contract because that's something that I think is
really important that Your Honor do, but --

THE COURT: But you can't -- SIPA doesn't let you assert --

MR. BRILLIANT: But what I was going to say -- but the bottom line is, as I say, SIPA doesn't let you assert it and Judge Blaine said, you know, that SIPA is right about that so, you know, I don't know what, you know, what you're really saying to me, you know, that we should be, you know, raising that claim and then taking that up, you know,

Page 58 1 assuming that, you know, that it --2 THE COURT: I'm just trying to line things up between here and MF Global. 3 4 MR. BRILLIANT: Okay. 5 THE COURT: Because part of your argument is that 6 MF Global's -- I understand it's not binding on me, but it's 7 not dispositive. I shouldn't follow it here. I can't 8 apply it. 9 MR. BRILLIANT: That's right. Our view is this, 10 it's not binding and it's not, you know, dispositive in 11 their differences in the context --12 THE COURT: No. 13 MR. BRILLIANT: -- their claims are being raised as well as, you know, they say New York law and Illinois law 14 15 are the same, but we're raising specific New York law issues 16 here --17 THE COURT: Yes. Okay. 18 MR. BRILLIANT: -- that public policy of New York 19 and New York law does not allow for exculpation for --20 THE COURT: Okay. MR. BRILLIANT: -- gross misconduct and willful 21 22 misconduct, gross negligence which occurred here in this 23 situation. 24 Your Honor, let's just turn and look at the 25 contract quickly. I'm sure from the pleadings that you're

aware of these things, but I think that, you know, that the contracts, it says very different things --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BRILLIANT: -- than what Mr. Miller would ask

Your Honor to find. If you turn to the beginning of the

contract, you know, in the preamble it says, "This agreement

sets forth the terms of conditions under which Lehman

Brothers, you know, (as defined below) will open and

maintain prime brokerage accounts in your name and otherwise

transact business with you as our customer."

Now, it says Lehman Brothers. It doesn't say LBI and it says that Lehman Brothers will open and maintain prime brokerage accounts in your name. The next line says, "In consideration of Lehman Brothers opening a prime brokerage account for you, you agree to the following." And then the rest of the agreement, you know, follows.

Now, Lehman Brothers, you know, is defined here as being all the Debtor entities that we filed the proofs of claim against. It's not just LBI. So you start out with the standpoint it's not, you know, they would say, well the only party that agreed to be your prime broker was LBI, but that's not right. It's Lehman Brothers. We agreed to be a customer of Lehman Brothers pursuant to their agreement.

And the document, the agreement deals with how the logistics of how Lehman Brothers was going to, you know, provide all

those services, you know, to Stonehill, to the customer.

And then the agreement, Your Honor, is signed by, you know, the parties to this, you know, it's signed as an accepted and agreed to and it says, "By Lehman Brothers,

Inc. as signatory for itself and as agent for the affiliates named herein."

So, you know, the party to this agreement is all of the Lehman Brothers' entities, so it is not that this is just a, you know, a contract where LBI, you know, agreed to be, you know, the, you know, the customer. I'm sorry, where LBI, you know, agreed to be the prime broker. It's Lehman Brothers agreed to provide, you know, the prime brokerage services provided herein.

THE COURT: I'm just not getting that. I mean, the only entity that could act as a prime broker was LBI.

It clearly says that in the first sentence. It says a prime brokerage account opened pursuant to this agreement will be opened at Lehman Brothers, Inc. LBI.

MR. BRILLIANT: No, that's right, Your Honor, but I think -- I think, Your Honor, what, you know, what our allegation is, all right, and I think the only fair way, I think, to read the contract, Your Honor, is that this is a contract where Lehman Brothers agreed to provide all of these services and with respect to these issues, LBI is Lehman Brothers' agent for purposes of the prime brokerage

account.

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THE COURT: But it -- I'm just not -- I'm just --I hear you, but I'm just not seeing it that way and it goes back to something that Mr. Miller was talking about which is -- and related to your bailment argument. That is that this would appear to be drafted that way -- again, I'm not making a factual determination, I'm just stating an observation. That when you follow this down to, for example, paragraph 3, security interest and lien registration of securities, to acknowledge a business of all the Lehman entities that they were going to engage in other transactions in which counterparties to agreements with LBSF, LBHI, you know, LOTSI (ph), whoever it might be, we're going to have to post collateral. LBHI or whatever counterparty that was can hold the collateral so that there is this prime brokerage agreement in which it's made clear that when another Lehman entity takes collateral, security, they're going to hand it over to LBI because LBI under the law is the only entity that can hold securities, because it's the only licensed prime broker.

So sure, everybody is in here, right, but that doesn't translate into creating -- necessarily translate into creating the sweeping obligations that you say exist that everybody was acting as, you know, the counterparty here for the purposes of the safekeeping, if you will, of

1 Stonehill Securities.

MR. BRILLIANT: Your Honor, I think my argument is a little bit more subtle than that.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BRILLIANT: Or sophisticated, which is that, you know, and again, you know, the agreement says Lehman Brothers, all these entities, you know, will open up, you know, will, you know, will maintain prime brokerage accounts. And then it says and you will be a customer of Lehman Brothers. So just give me a moment, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. BRILLIANT: Now, I recognize that there are certain provisions where LBI, as the regulated broker/dealer, agreed to open the prime brokerage account. You know, our view is that the way this is set up, and the signatory line reflects this as well, is that these entities were all agents -- or LBI for purposes of setting up the agreement was the agent for Lehman Brothers.

So let me give you an example in a different context just to make it a little simpler. So let's say a client, you know, comes to my firm and they want to do, you know, a transaction that involves multinational, you know, transactions. Now, we have, you know, we're actually other than a (indiscernible), we're just one law firm, but some law firms have multiple entities because of, you know,

regulated (indiscernible).

THE COURT: Right.

MR. BRILLIANT: So the client comes in, they hire Deckard and it goes through and it says in the engagement letter you're hiring Deckard, blah, blah, blah, blah, and then it says, you know, partner X, Y and Z of such and such, you know, entity, you know, Deckard, Europe. You know, it doesn't (indiscernible) that way, but it says Deckard Europe and then Deckard Europe will provide the issues in Europe and then there's a, you know, a breach of the agreement.

Deckard Europe or can you sue Deckard? Well the way this, you know, and I guess what I would say is you retained the firm and that's what happened here in this agreement, Your Honor, when you read the entire agreement it's very clear that what happened here is Lehman Brothers, the defined entities, you know, agreed to provide all of these services. And what LBI is, is an agent of Lehman Brothers for purpose of providing some portion of the services, but all of the Lehman Brothers' entities entered into this agreement and agreed to provide all of these services with the --

THE COURT: But they couldn't have agreed. That's my point. They couldn't have agreed to provide all the services because the only broker/dealer was LBI.

MR. BRILLIANT: Right, but, Your Honor, they

Page 64 1 agreed through their agent. They agreed -- our allegation 2 is that they agreed through their agent, through their 3 subsidiary or affiliate, LBI, to provide the prime 4 brokerage, you know, the prime brokerage services. 5 Now, the presumption, so and let me cite some 6 cases to you, Your Honor, because this came up in their 7 reply brief and so we didn't get an opportunity, you know, 8 to cite this. 9 THE COURT: Now, this -- so under your theory, 10 putting aside there's alter ego issues, putting -- if 11 customer claims had not been paid, if the securities hadn't 12 been returned or customer claims were not paid in full at 13 LBI, under your theory every single customer would have a 14 claim for any loss against other Lehman entities? 15 MR. BRILLIANT: Those who signed this contract 16 with this language, yes. 17 THE COURT: Yeah. 18 MR. BRILLIANT: Yes. THE COURT: Every -- so every single one of them? 19 20 MR. BRILLIANT: To the extent that they signed 21 this agreement. 22 THE COURT: -- who signed the contract that says, 23 customer account prime -- customer account agreement, prime brokerage Lehman Brothers, Inc., account number. Every 24 25 single person who signed one of these would have a claim

Page 65 1 against all the other Lehman entities? 2 MR. BRILLIANT: Well, Your Honor --THE COURT: That's absurd, Mr. Brilliant. 3 MR. BRILLIANT: Well --4 5 THE COURT: That can't be what you're telling me. 6 MR. BRILLIANT: Okay. Well, Your Honor, let's 7 just step back, because you're making the assumption that everyone had the same prime brokerage agreement at the time 8 of the filing. The vast majority of customers, I'm sure, 9 10 were not prime brokerage customers, were just -- just

brokerage customers and didn't have a similar, you know, type of agreement. But what I'm telling you is that this

13 particular contract is a Lehman Brothers contract. It says

14 itself it's a Lehman Brothers contract, you know, Lehman

15 Brothers agreed to perform these services that LBI, for

16 purposes of these arguments, was an agent of Lehman Brothers

17 and the other entities made themselves liable for the

18 performance of this agreement by virtue of the signature.

Under, you know, Your Honor, as we cite in our brief, under New York law where you have joint parties here, you know, and you don't specifically sever, you know, liabilities, you know, they're deemed to be, you know, joint and severally liable. You know, it's presumed to be. so there's a, you know, it would have to be, you know, some,

you know, evidence to overcome it, you know, at worst, Your

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Honor, we think it's ambiguous as to whether or not -- we don't think it's ambiguous, we think they did agree to be joint and severally liable, but to the extent they didn't -- Your Honor thinks it's not clear because of the, you know, the difference in the language and you think that's ambiguous and would be subject, you know, to, you know, to evidence as to what the intent of, you know, what the intent of the parties, you know, was here.

But, you know, their argument, Your Honor, is that since LBI was the only registered broker/dealer, that they're the only party, you know, that could be a bailee.

You know, I mean, that's just wrong. I mean, you know, in ordinary everyday life, you know, bailees use agents, you know, to perform their obligations.

So I want to just give you a couple of cites that, you know, cases that you can look at, you know, that where, you know, where parties are liable for their, you know, their agents bailment or they're still bailees even though their, you know, their agent was holding the goods, you know.

Mays v. New York, New Hampshire (sic) Railroad, 97 N.Y. Supp. 2d 909, 1950, you know, there the Court found that an actual bailment exists when there is an actual delivery of the property to the bailee or his agents or constructive delivery comprehending all those acts was not

truly compromising real possession have been held by legal construction equivalent to acts of delivery which include symbolical or substituted delivery.

Goldman Sachs Mortgage Company v. Natixis 2008

N.Y. Misc. Lexus 9849 Superior Court, New York, 2008.

Finding that a defendant accepted bailee letters when its custodian agent took possession of mortgage loan documents.

Klotz v. Morocco, 288 N.Y. Supp. 684, 1967

finding, "Plaintiff established a prima facie case for

bailment by proving delivery to defendant's agent and

failure to redeliver upon demand." It was reversed on other

grounds, but, you know, the proposition wasn't reversed.

So, Your Honor, it's -- the idea here that just because LBI was the only broker/dealer means that somehow it was the only one that had these obligations, just it's a matter of law it's not right. The question is looking at the contract itself and trying to discern whether --

THE COURT: So if the securities hadn't been returned, you believe that there would be a claim against other Lehman entities, non-LBI Lehman entities for the return of the securities?

MR. BRILLIANT: We believe, Your Honor, that, you know, and it's not relevant to this today, right, but we believe that in addition to the diminution claims, if we wanted to, we could have, you know, we did give back, as we

Page 68 1 said most of the securities but they're joint --2 THE COURT: But answer my -- answer my question. 3 MR. BRILLIANT: Yes. Yes, we -- I believe they 4 are joint and severally liable. 5 THE COURT: But that's contrary -- that's contrary 6 to a decision that's already actually been rendered in this 7 case by the district court. 8 MR. BRILLIANT: Well --9 THE COURT: Just --10 MR. BRILLIANT: That may be, but, you know, but in 11 connection, but I'm saying --12 THE COURT: This whole theory of --13 MR. BRILLIANT: But I'm saying based on a -- I'm 14 saying on our contract, these other entities agreed that 15 they would -- they were responsible for, you know, for all 16 of the services here, that they're joint and severally 17 liable. Yes, that's what I'm telling Your Honor. I can't 18 -- I'm not familiar with the other case. I can't tell you was that based on, you know, a specific contract or as a 19 20 matter of law. 21 THE COURT: It's unfair to ambush you. It's a 22 decision in the First Bank Puerto Rico case by the district 23 court, that I see a connection to here in which it was 24 argued that there was a claim against LBHI in connection 25 with securities held by LBI. I see similarities. It's not

Page 69 1 on all fours, but in any event we can -- we can move on. 2 MR. BRILLIANT: Right. 3 THE COURT: We're going to have to move on, 4 because I have another group --5 MR. BRILLIANT: Right. 6 THE COURT: -- of parties here. So let me stop 7 interrupting you. 8 MR. BRILLIANT: Okay. Well, but I do want to 9 answer your questions, Your Honor. Obviously that's better 10 than just droning on. But our -- but our view is that when 11 you read the precursor language, the signature page, you go 12 through the contract itself, that this is a contract where 13 all of the, you know, the Lehman Brother entities agreed to 14 be liable, you know, for all of the obligations. 15 The other thing, Your Honor, is, you know, as Your 16 Honor knows, this is a, you know, this is a form contract; 17 it was, you know, basically adhesion contract. You know, it should be --18 19 THE COURT: So what about -- I'm sorry, I'm 20 contradicting myself. What about paragraph 21 though? Look 21 at paragraph 21. 22 MR. BRILLIANT: Yes, Your Honor. But I guess what 23 I'm -- what I'm saying --24 THE COURT: Okay. So it says LBI is going to act 25 as a prime broker for you and lists all these things.

Page 70 1 LBI shall be responsible for settling trades executed on 2 your behalf. So LBI doesn't -- you try to execute a trade -- LBI doesn't settle it because of chaos or because 3 4 of SIPA or some, whatever, you know, hurricane. You say, 5 ah-ha, LBHI, you're on the hook for that even though this 6 says, LBI, you're the one who's going to settle the trade. 7 MR. BRILLIANT: Right. 8 THE COURT: Under your theory --9 MR. BRILLIANT: Yes. 10 THE COURT: -- the words on this page don't mean 11 anything. 12 MR. BRILLIANT: No, that's not right at all, Your 13 They do -- they do, like I said, it's like if you go 14 back to, you know, my analogy where you hire a law firm and 15 they designate certain people will do things. So certain 16 people, you know, agree to do things, but they're agents for 17 the group which are joint and severally liable. Your Honor, I mean, I don't think -- you don't --18 wouldn't disagree with me if it said in here, right, if it 19 20 just said in here, Lehman Brothers will provide these 21 services and all the entities agree to be joint and 22 severally liable, you don't disagree with me that that would 23 be effective, right? 24 THE COURT: That would be good. 25 MR. BRILLIANT: Okay. So --

Page 71 1 THE COURT: I mean, that would be more -- that 2 would be --3 MR. BRILLIANT: Right. 4 THE COURT: -- that would be clearer, but we've 5 got the opposite here. 6 MR. BRILLIANT: Well, we don't have. That's what 7 I'm saying, we don't have the opposite here, Your Honor. If 8 you go through the document 29 and 30 --9 THE COURT: Right. 10 MR. BRILLIANT: -- which we've talked about the 11 exculpation and the limitation of liability, they talk about 12 Lehman Brothers shall not, right? 13 THE COURT: Well, is there a statement that says 14 that all Lehman entities shall be jointly and severally 15 liable for all the obligations of the parties under this 16 agreement? Is there something that says that? 17 MR. BRILLIANT: No. 18 THE COURT: No. MR. BRILLIANT: But there's a signature that says 19 20 they're signing on behalf of all the entities, but Your 21 Honor, it doesn't say either way. That's the point, right. 22 It doesn't say either way. 23 It could also have said -- if you, I mean, if you 24 look at, Your Honor pointed to 21, if you go down to 21, you 25 know, you know, you know, J, or, you know, I rather, you

know, the -- you know, it says Lehman Brothers will not be responsible for ex -- or omissions of any executing broker.

Now, an executing broker is not any of the other Lehman entities, you know, that's the party that's stands between them.

THE COURT: Yeah, yeah.

MR. BRILLIANT: But they could have also said, you know, that Lehman Brothers will not be obligated for any obligations, you know, of LBI. It doesn't say that. And New York law, Your Honor, presumes -- you should read the cases we cite in our, you know --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BRILLIANT: -- in our brief. You know, New York law presumes that when parties enter into a contract jointly like this, like all the, you know, the LB, you know, the LBHI and its affiliate entities did, that unless it's, you know, unless there's specific severing language, that they're joint and severally liable. And here there's no -- no severing language.

Now, the language that, you know, that the Lehman entities point to and that Your Honor is pointing to doesn't say that they're not liable, it just says that there are specific things that these entities will do, but it doesn't say that they're not doing it as an agent, which is if you read the signature block, they say they're signing as an,

you know, as an agent for the other entities. Our view is that they were the agent for the entities with respect to those specific issues and therefore they were -- the whole entity was liable for all of the obligations.

Like I said, Your Honor, it's not like -- I can't point to something that says they agreed to be joint and severally liable, nor can they point to something that says that they don't. But if you look at the first paragraph, you know, it says, you're a customer of Lehman Brothers.

Lehman Brothers. These are the terms on which Lehman Brothers will open a prime brokerage account for you. It doesn't say these are the, you know, that LBI will open a prime brokerage account for you.

You're right, paragraph 1 and 21, you know, you know, say something slightly different, but it's how Lehman Brothers as defined below will open an account for you. So the combination of that, the signature, the lack of severing clause, we believe makes them joint and severally liable. At a minimum, you know, we think it's -- and we also think, Your Honor, it needs to be interpreted against Lehman Brothers because it was their form, you know, agreement. If they wanted to say they weren't liable, they clearly could have done it. They put in 29, they put in 30, they put in all kinds of other exclusions, but they chose not to do it and they have to live with it.

Pg 74 of 205 Page 74 1 And they, you know, as Mr. Miller said, a 2 contract, you know, he said, we haven't alleged that there 3 were, you know, any benefits the other Lehman entities, you know, got here, and that's not right, but the bottom line --4 5 and in our proof of claim specifically we say, you know, 6 that they did. 7 But the Lehman Brother entities got the benefits 8 of this contract in a whole lot of different ways, you know, 9 the ability to, you know, have, you know, lend securities, 10 do various other things throughout the --11 THE COURT: Well, that was the whole point. 12 I mean --13 MR. BRILLIANT: Yeah. THE COURT: They weren't just doing it for fun. 14 15 MR. BRILLIANT: Right. Right. 16 THE COURT: Everyone wanted to make money. 17 MR. BRILLIANT: And so they took on this 18 additional responsibility because they got benefits for it. And if they wanted to say we're going to get the benefits of 19 20 all this agreement, including having, you know, you do your 21 prime brokerage work at LBI but not have LBI -- but not be 22 liable for LBI, they -- it was incumbent upon them to put in severing language. Not having done that, it's presumed as a 23

matter of New York law that they are liable and there is

nothing in the agreement itself that says that they're not.

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Page 75 1 THE COURT: Okay. 2 MR. BRILLIANT: So --3 THE COURT: All right. Let me hear --MR. BRILLIANT: Let me just go back to the tort 4 5 claims quickly, Your Honor. 6 THE COURT: Quickly. Okay. 7 MR. BRILLIANT: I know that this has taken me a 8 long time, but you had Mr. Miller up here a little bit 9 longer than me at this point. 10 THE COURT: That's okay. 11 MR. BRILLIANT: So, Your Honor, with respect to 12 the, you know, to the, you know, the tort claims, the first 13 thing is with respect to the, you know, the speaking, you 14 know, you know, caution rule, which, you know, they raised 15 for the first time, you know, you know, in connection with 16 their reply brief. We don't think that, you know, you know, 17 applies here for, you know, for two -- two reasons. 18 You know, one, it does not apply to facts, you 19 know, or to opinions that incorporate present facts and 20 what's been alleged here were facts that they, you know, 21 they, you know, Mr. Wickham, you know, and in the conference 22 call, you know, well it's really only in the conference 23 call, because the only, the only, you know, caution was alleged in the, you know, the caution is in the conference 24 25 call. You know, the allegation is that they said they have

adequate liquidity and that incorporates present facts so it doesn't apply.

Also, the speaking caution rule doesn't apply if the speaker did not have genuinely or reasonably believed in the opinion. You know, so, you know, this is really in the nature of an affirmative type defense, you know, but it's not appropriate here in a 12(b)(6) type context where the, you know, the, where the, you know, they have not alleged that, you know, they say we haven't alleged, you know, you know, that these facts weren't true, that they didn't have the liquidity that they said they did and various things.

Well, we do because we say in paragraph 16 that these were all misrepresentations. We, you know, and we also say that the speakers knew or should have known, you know, that, you know, as what's, you know, Your Honor, read in the attachment that there were, you know, there were risks that weren't, you know, disclosed.

So it really comes down to, you know, the issue, whether it was adequate pleadings, but the speak of caution rule, you know, doesn't apply in this case. And I would, you know, point Your Honor to Iowa Public Employees

Retirement System, 620 F.3d 137, the second thirty - 2nd

Circuit 2010, you know, where the Court found a forecast may extrapolate present or historical facts into the future -- and I'm skipping a little bit -- but in each instance, the

forward looking elements and the non-forward looking are severable. Here, characterizations of MF Global's risk management system, that the system was robust, for example, invite the inference that the system will reduce the firm's risk. However, the speaks caution does not apply insofar as those characterizations communication present or historical facts as to the measures taken.

And so basically you can't just say, you know,
like they're saying, like we gave up caution so you couldn't
believe anything. It doesn't work that way. You know,
there are, if you say, you know, it only protects people
from future statements and it only protects them for the
actual future projections. But if the future statement
incorporates current -- the current facts like they do here,
like we have adequate liquidity, you know, the -- you know,
the --

THE COURT: But there's more than we have adequate liquidity, there has to be a, we have adequate liquidity for what, so that the for what is in the future, right?

MR. BRILLIANT: Well, but there's two issues. And here, Your Honor, because of the bankruptcy filing being so soon after, I mean, you know, it's not as if, you know, they can say that we had adequate, you know, you know, liquidity on Friday, you know, and then on, you know, on Monday we -- on Sunday night we filed bankruptcy. You know, it may be

that something changed, but that's -- they -- from a pleading perspective, at this point, Your Honor, there were currently embedded in, you know, there were current facts that were, you know, that were, you know, discussed that people had the right to reasonably rely. You can't just, you know, forward looking statements, you know, are, get the benefit of this.

THE COURT: But you're not alleging that in this phone call, there was a statement made that have -- are making it \$100 billion in government securities sitting in an account? There's no -- right? That would be a -- that would be a bad misrepresentation, right?

MR. BRILLIANT: Right.

THE COURT: What you are -- what you're pointing to are talking points, our liquidity is strong, right?

MR. BRILLIANT: All right. Well, Your Honor, there's two different issues here. They're not saying that the conversation with Wickham is protected by, you know, by this (indiscernible) issue, because there was no -- there was no caution, it wasn't an SEC document, it wasn't in the call, so that's not -- they're not alleging that this particular rule applies like that.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. BRILLIANT: They're just saying with respect to the, you know, the --

Page 79 1 THE COURT: Earnings call. 2 MR. BRILLIANT: -- the earnings call. 3 THE COURT: Right. 4 MR. BRILLIANT: I guess what I'm saying with 5 respect to the earnings call, you know, our allegation, you 6 know, is that there was misrepresentations of fact that were 7 given in the call and that this does not apply and that this rule, which they raised in their reply brief, just doesn't 8 9 apply. And if you read the Iowa Public Employees case --10 THE COURT: Okay. 11 MR. BRILLIANT: -- I think it will be pretty 12 clear. And that's a situation where the district court, you 13 know, applied the law the way they were talking about and it 14 was reversed on appeal. 15 THE COURT: Okay. 16 MR. BRILLIANT: The other issue is, Your Honor, is 17 that with respect to the, you know, the, you know, this 18 issue, the question is whether or not the party, you know, 19 genuinely believed the information to be true. And if you 20 look at American International Group, 741 F.Supp. 2d 511, 21 you know, there it says, you know, that if the speaker does 22 not genuinely or reasonably believe what they are saying, 23 that there are, you know, that, you know, the fact that you give caution doesn't insulate you. You actually have to 24

have genuine belief that what you're saying is true.

we've alleged that, you know, that there are misrepresentations.

And as, Your Honor, we point out, Your Honor, that the examiner, you know, said that, you know, Lehman, you know, had, you know, gone to great lengths to make its customers, you know, you know, giving them information. So we believe that there's enough of a factual, you know, record here that, you know, for us to show that, you know, that there was, you know, that there was fraud, you know, you know, here to induce, you know, Stonehill, to continue to, you know, maintain its relationship.

And so we just don't, you know, don't think that, you know, that, you know, that the pleadings that we have don't adequately represent (indiscernible) issues.

And with respect to Wickham, Your Honor, I think it's, you know, they say, well, we don't identify what entity, you know, he was with. What happened was we -- and this was alleged in the, you know, in the proof of claim, you know, Mr. Motulsky called a very senior person at LBHI and then he got a call back from Mr. Wickham, you know, who was calling him back, you know, on -- we -- and this is properly alleged in the proof of claim, you know, that, you know, called him back on behalf of, you know, all of the Lehman entities. You know, he didn't specify specifically

which one, you know, he worked for, but as we say we believe that he is a senior executive, you know, in the client services department and he spoke on behalf of all the Lehman entities, you know, you know, to, you know, induce Stonehill to, you know, to maintain its accounts at the company.

Your Honor, so I think from our perspective, you know, you know, at the sufficiency hearing, we think the, you know, the proof of claim, you know, adequately, you know, you know, states claims both under contract and as a matter of law to the extent that Your Honor thinks the contract, you know, is, you know, whether or not there's joint and several liability. We think at worst from our perspective, it's ambiguous and we should have the opportunity to do discovery and show that the intention of the parties was that the --

THE COURT: But if I apply the force majeure clause the way that Judge Glen did in MF Global and as Mr. Miller suggests, I don't -- we don't get to any of that.

MR. BRILLIANT: Well, I think, Your Honor, I think you, you know, that is one way to look at this on the contract side, but I don't think that that's right either, because I think you'd also have to find that there's no allegations that the loss here comes from, you know, you know, the, you know, the willful misconduct.

THE COURT: No, no, I'm talking about the 29, not

Page 82 1 30. 2 MR. BRILLIANT: No, no, I understand, but as a 3 matter, you know, you know, my view, Your Honor, you may 4 disagree --5 THE COURT: Yeah. 6 MR. BRILLIANT: -- that is a matter of law in 7 interpreting a New York contract that every force majeure or 8 other exculpation provision --9 THE COURT: Implies it. 10 MR. BRILLIANT: -- implies that it will not be 11 applied in the context where there's been, you know, willful 12 misconduct by the party. And the allegation here is that 13 there was willful misconduct, you know, from the parties and 14 therefore, you know, although that may be an affirmative 15 defense they would raise, they would have to prove that at 16 trial that -- that there was no willful misconduct, you 17 know, such that, you know, that should apply. I mean, absent that, Your Honor, as I said, you 18 19 know, earlier, what they're really saying is we can defraud 20 you, but if your ultimate damages, you know, relate to the SIPA proceeding, then you're not -- then, you know, we don't 21 22 have -- then you have no claim against us and that just 23 can't be. 24 You know, in the context that you laid out where, 25 you know --

Pg 83 of 205 Page 83 THE COURT: But conversely, if it can be, then I would have a huge crowd of people in the hallway and I don't. MR. BRILLIANT: Well, you won't, Your Honor, because the bar date has passed and you don't have to worry about opening up the floodgates at this point, so that's not an issue. THE COURT: No, no, no, I wasn't making a floodgates argument. I was making a, you know, we're in the greatest city in the world with the smartest lawyers in the world and with all due respect to you, Mr. Brilliant, you know, the case has not been overwhelmed by similar claims. So everybody who was on the earnings call or everybody who had a prime brokerage agreement and everybody who had a similar portfolio of securities, you know, not Apple or not something, you know, securities that didn't weather the downturn in the fall of 2008, they would all be here. And I'm just observing, it's not dispositive --MR. BRILLIANT: Right. THE COURT: -- of anything, I'm just observing that they're not. MR. BRILLIANT: Well, Your Honor, I think, you know, empirical experience as to who brings claims or

doesn't bring claims I don't think is really relevant as to

whether it's a matter of law --

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1	THE COURT: I agree with you.
2	MR. BRILLIANT: claims exist.
3	THE COURT: I agree.
4	MR. BRILLIANT: I guess the other thing I would
5	say is, I don't know to what extent other parties, you know,
6	had the type of conversations that Mr. Motulsky had with Mr.
7	Wickham and whether or not there are, you know, other
8	parties who actually have, you know, fraud claims. So
9	THE COURT: Okay.
10	MR. BRILLIANT: so I think
11	THE COURT: Let me let Mr. Miller get back up
12	because I'm not only keeping the Newport Global folks
13	waiting, but I have another crowd coming in at 2:00. So,
14	Mr. Miller?
15	MR. MILLER: Yes, Your Honor. May I briefly
16	clarify a note from the client and then I'll speak.
17	THE COURT: Yes, of course.
18	(Pause)
19	MR. MILLER: Thank you, Your Honor.
20	MR. BRILLIANT: Your Honor?
21	THE COURT: Yes.
22	MR. BRILLIANT: Thank you. The client points out
23	to me there's to answer your question about why other
24	people aren't here. He says it may very well be that there
25	was a very small amount of prime brokerage clients that were

Page 85 1 LBI rather than LBIE as of the time of the SIPA proceeding 2 and so there --3 THE COURT: Okay. 4 MR. BRILLIANT: -- may not have --5 THE COURT: All right. Well, as you point out it's 6 neither here nor there. 7 MR. BRILLIANT: Exactly. 8 THE COURT: It's just interesting. 9 MR. BRILLIANT: But that's what he tells me is, 10 you know, there may not be as many as one thinks there would 11 have. 12 THE COURT: Thank you. 13 MR. MILLER: Ralph Miller again, Your Honor. I'll 14 try to be brief, but let me hit a few key points. First of 15 all, with regard to the SIPA policy, Judge Glen mentioned 16 it, but he didn't rely on any policy finding that SIPA 17 prohibited this as I read his opinion he relied on the force 18 majeure clause. 19 I want to talk just a little bit about this agency 20 and the way the contract's put together. 21 THE COURT: Yeah. 22 MR. MILLER: First, the -- if we look at the contract -- and I have just three or four points to 23 identify. The first thing he referred to is a recital, 24 25 which is really just a setup for the discussion. It's not

an operative provision. And it says, Lehman Brothers is going to be defined below.

If you go to the signature block, which is really very informative, it is Lehman Brothers, Inc. as signatory for itself and as agent for the affiliates named herein. So it signs for itself and it also signs for the affiliates.

We go over to Paragraph 21 it actually recites the authority for LBI to act as a prime broker by referring to an SEC --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. MILLER: -- no action letter.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. MILLER: And in our reply in paragraph 28, we cited a series of cases that says that an agent cannot -that a principal cannot act in an unlawful way under the law of agency. It's well settled and we cite Minor (ph) v. New York State Department of Corrections Services case. It's well settled -- a tenet of agency that a principal may only do through an agent those things that he may lawfully do personally.

And so if -- LBI cannot create the right of LBHI and others to act as principals or agents for things that they're not lawfully entitled to do. It can't make them prime brokers. It can't delegate its prime brokerage responsibilities. So we think the law is clear that it

could not be doing that. It's also --

THE COURT: But what Mr. Brilliant is saying is that LBI signed and agreed on behalf of the Lehman affiliates that they would be jointly and severally liable. So that's what he says.

MR. MILLER: Well, that's what he says, but that's not what the contract says, Your Honor. Because the contract makes it clear that the only prime brokerage relationship is going to be with LBI. It's on LBI letterhead, by the way, and it defines LBI first and it says a prime brokerage account opened pursuant to this agreement will be opened at Lehman Brothers, Inc. And it says, "all transactions, agreements and contracts between you and Lehman Brothers have been entered into in consideration of which other." And then the bailment provision, by the way, which is also relevant to this is in a section called security interest and lien registration and securities. It grants liens in these securities basically for the benefit of other Lehman Brothers entities who may do business.

And the bailment language clearly states you hereby acknowledge and agree that all such assets held by or through any Lehman Brothers' entity are held as collateral by such Lehman Brothers' entities' agent and bailee for itself and all other Lehman Brothers' entities and as such, each Lehman Brothers' entity is to will comply with any

Pg 88 of 205 Page 88 orders or instructions originated by any other Lehman Brothers' entity with respect to or in connection with such collateral without your further consent. So the purpose and the structure of this is it's a security agreement as well as the creation of a prime brokerage agreement, but it doesn't have any obligations imposed on any of the other Lehman Brothers' entities. This is -- I would suspect, Your Honor, that some lawyer decided that it was better to make them parties than to make them third party beneficiaries. But in effect what you have here is the --THE COURT: Right, but it's what I described. MR. MILLER: Yes. THE COURT: Was this document creates the link between other Lehman entities serving as counterparties in transactions which require the posting of collateral and then those other Lehman entities taking the collateral, handing it over to LBI, because only LBI could -- was the only prime broker in the crowd. MR. MILLER: That may well be true, Your Honor. I think that's a fair way to do this. THE COURT: Again, not deciding facts on a motion to dismiss.

contract and again, I don't think the agency argument adds

MR. MILLER: No, but I think you can look at the

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anything to the position. A couple of more points, Your Honor.

He said -- the point was made by Mr. Brilliant that this is a sufficiency hearing. That's true, Your Honor, but in effect, the mechanism that's been adopted in this Court is that parties file a claim, there is an objection. This is a very substantive objection. They then file a response.

And I started by saying if you take everything in the claim and everything in the response and treat those as essentially a complaint and an amended complaint, we've got the same mechanism as if you had a motion to dismiss.

THE COURT: It's a 12(b)(6). It's a 12(b)(6) hearing.

MR. MILLER: It's a 12(b)(6) hearing, Your Honor.

And he said, well we weren't -- they weren't put on notice
on the speaks caution. Paragraph 55 of the objection says

Stonehill's alleged reliance on a statement made during the
September 10, 2008 earnings call is unreasonable as a matter
of law.

The call began with a disclaimer advising
listeners that statements may contained forward looking
statements that are not guarantees of future performance but
only represent the firm's current expectations, estimates
and projections regarding future events.

A subsequent statement was that Lehman Brothers' liquidity position remains very strong -- if they made that, it is at most a mere representation of opinion that cannot support an action for fraud, and we cite some cases. they were on notice, of the -- although the speaks caution phrase was not used, they were on notice of the unreasonable THE COURT: Could you address Mr. Brilliant's finale, if you will, that if I don't agree with them, what that means is that there can be outright utter fraud and there's no ability to recover the damages for that in the SIPA claim context. MR. MILLER: Well, Your Honor, I don't --THE COURT: It was a very -- I mean, it's a very sweeping statement. MR. MILLER: It is very sweeping and the problem, Your Honor, of course, in a motion to dismiss context with well what if we'd alleged X and what if we'd alleged Y is they didn't allege X or Y. What they have alleged is essentially that there was this earnings call and I think that's pretty clear how that's dealt with and they allege that there was this phone call with Mr. Wickham. Now, I -- there's more facts around the phone call with Mr. Wickham than anything else, but the facts all are

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that this was an assurance of performance of the contract and there's no allegation that the statements that were made were known by Mr. Wickham to be false about current facts or that they were -- that they say that it was -- they say that senior executives knew that they were wrong and they say as you pointed out, Your Honor, that Mr. Wickham appears to have been reading talking points.

Now, they are saying those talking points must have been wrong because there was a business failure. Now, the fraud by hindsight doctrine is pretty clear that you cannot infer falsity from statements made that are then followed by a bad event. You've got to do more. You've got to say something was specifically wrong.

In accounting cases, for example, somebody says there was a clean audit opinion and this business went broke, we're going to sue the accountants. The securities law and the securities law is actually easier because the standards are lower --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. MILLER: -- than common law fraud. And, Your Honor, Oliver Wendell Holmes famously said that even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked. And fraud is an intentional tort. It carries a lot of consequences including, not in Chapter 11, but normally punitive damages, but it has to do with someone having an

intent to harm the other party knowing at the time that it is -- that it's being done that the statements are false and to produce reliance.

Wishing and hoping and assuring a party that they're going to -- a party is going to try to perform a contract does not constitute common law fraud, and that's actually New York law. That's the same promise that's already made in the contract. It was already made in writing. And the fact that the person has some doubts about it at a later date does not convert that into fraud.

So, your hypothetical, which I'm trying to respond to, isn't this case. Would it be possible for there to be a specific fraudulent statement?

THE COURT: Well, the one that I gave the hypothetical of, great news we've got \$100 billion in cash sitting in my office and that was not true.

MR. MILLER: That could be. And Your Honor, in the -- if somebody said we've just gotten communication from the FDIC that we have a loan for \$100 billion, it's coming through tomorrow, it's not -- it hasn't hit the news yet and if that's all false, that might -- and the person making it knows it's false, they might get there, but that's not the allegations that have been made here and they've had a chance to do the best they can and they just haven't gotten over Rule 9.

And I think again, these general sorts of allegations are going to be possible with regard to almost any business failure. There's almost always going to be some storm clouds on the horizon and somebody who says, you know, are you all going to survive this storm and there's going to be employees all the time who are going to be saying things about, we really mean to, you know, we're getting it together, sales are up, we're doing better. And as this Court knows, this is a little bit of the reason that there may not be -- it's hard to argue that there's time travelers, where are the time tourists from the future.

I mean, the argument here, Your Honor, is if this was always a cause of action, how come there are not just thousands and thousands of cases out there. And the answer really is that those kinds of things are not the kinds of representations that create torts and particularly where you have this force majeure clause.

And we don't think they cite any case law, by the way, in New York, that says the force majeure clauses cannot cover a cause of loss even though there is some allegation that there was a contribution to that loss through some sort of negligence or misrepresentation.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. MILLER: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. BRILLIANT: Your Honor, may I have 30 seconds?

Page 94 Truly it will be 30 seconds. Your Honor, I just ask Your 1 2 Honor to look at paragraph 14. 3 THE COURT: Of the agreement? 4 MR. BRILLIANT: No, of the proof of claim. 5 THE COURT: Yes. 6 MR. BRILLIANT: Because the types of allegations 7 that Your Honor was saying would be problematic and that 8 counsel is saying would be problematic were made. We say in 9 the second sentence, Mr. Motulsky recalls that Mr. Wickham 10 stated that Lehman had adequate liquidity because unlike 11 Bear Stearns, it prudently financed its customers with match funding and it had sufficient liquidity from sources it 12 13 believed to be reliable to meet all of its obligations for a 14 year even if no new financing was available, that it had \$12 15 billion of surplus cash, and it also cited the availability 16 of secured financing from the federal reserve, none of which 17 was used. 18 So they did tell us that they had all of this, you know, this, this money, and that's what we relied on. And 19 20 as for, you know, the case law, you know, you know, counsel 21 says we didn't cite any cases and I would just refer you to 22 our brief and the MBIA case that we cited. 23 THE COURT: Where was what you just read to me? 24 MR. BRILLIANT: Paragraph 12. The attachment to 25 the proof of claim.

Page 95 1 THE COURT: No, paragraph 14. Mr. Motulsky 2 recalls that Mr. Wickham stated that Lehman had adequate 3 liquidity. MR. BRILLIANT: Yes. 4 Yes. 5 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 6 MR. MILLER: Your Honor, may I have ten seconds to 7 respond to that? And I'm sorry I will be brief. 8 THE COURT: Death by a thousand cuts. 9 MR. MILLER: I hope not, Your Honor. The call 10 with Mr. Wickham was supposed to be early September. The 11 SIPA proceeding was September 19th. 12 THE COURT: Right. 13 MR. MILLER: Lots of things happened between early 14 September and September 19th. The complaint in this case, 15 the claim and the response do not allege that those 16 statements were untrue when made. They allege they turned 17 out not to be true on September 19th. Thank you. THE COURT: All right. I know I have the Newport 18 19 Global folks waiting with some of the similar issues, but 20 this is a separate matter and I'm going to give you a ruling 21 right now. 22 The contract claims don't survive. I agree with 23 the arguments articulated in the briefs and here today by Mr. Miller with respect to the applicability of MF Global 24 25 and the lack of any meaningful dispositive distinction

between what's alleged here even taking it as true and what was alleged in MF Global. So the contract claims are dismissed with prejudice.

With respect to the so-called tort and fraud claims, any claim based on the earnings call is dismissed as a matter of law with prejudice.

With respect to the Wickham conversation type claims, dismissed without prejudice to being re-pled and the scope of the re-pleading is consistent with the deficiencies that have been identified by Lehman and to afford Stonehill a full opportunity consistent with its due process rights under the procedures that have been followed in this case to file an amended pleading that complies with the requirements of Rule 9(b) if not specifically applicable, but at that level for the purpose of being able to get to the next stage in these proceedings.

So I hope that was clear. And if I could ask

Mr. Miller if you could reduce that to an order and share it
with Mr. Brilliant.

MR. MILLER: Do you have a time for this, Your Honor?

THE COURT: I'll leave that to Mr. Brilliant to suggest what works for him, 60 days?

MR. BRILLIANT: Sixty days will be fine, Your Honor.

Page 97 1 THE COURT: Okay. 2 MR. BRILLIANT: And then Your Honor, I assume that 3 we would have some reasonable time to --THE COURT: Sure. You can work --4 5 MR. BRILLIANT: -- work out --6 THE COURT: -- out a briefing schedule --7 MR. BRILLIANT: -- whatever we think might be an 8 objection. 9 THE COURT: -- on that. And then for the purposes 10 of preserving your appeal rights at that point, I'll write 11 an opinion that explains the ruling today in more detail so 12 that to the extent you wish to take it up on appeal, you 13 have a recent decision. All right? 14 MR. MILLER: And just so I understand, is Your 15 Honor going to enter an order? 16 THE COURT: I'm going to enter an order that will 17 say decision to follow. 18 MR. BRILLIANT: And that will extend the appeal 19 date or --20 THE COURT: You should put that in the order to 21 make that clear. 22 MR. MILLER: Okay. That's not a final order on that issue. 23 24 THE COURT: Correct. Right. Right? Does that 25 work for you? It seems to me that just makes sense rather

Page 98 1 than have you wait some period of time for a written 2 decision and then to restart the process on the re-pleading. 3 MR. BRILLIANT: That works, Judge. 4 THE COURT: All right. In the spirit of moving 5 things along. All right. Thank you so much. This was 6 extremely interesting. 7 MR. BRILLIANT: Thank you for your time, Your 8 Honor. 9 THE COURT: I'm going to take about a seven-minute 10 break and at 12:10 we'll start on Newport Global and I 11 apologize for making you wait so long. 12 (Recessed and reconvened at 12:37 p.m.) 13 THE COURT: Okay. Ready when you are. MR. SMITH: Thank you, Your Honor, Turner Smith 14 15 with Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle. As you may know, 16 we are the conflicts counsel for Lehman Brothers Holdings, 17 Inc. which is the plan administrator, and so I'm here today 18 on the objection to Newport claims filed by Newport Global Opportunities Fund and Newport Global Credit Fund. 19 20 And, Your Honor, I know you're pressed for time, 21 and I'm going to try to get --22 THE COURT: No, I'll give you -- I have other 23 folks coming in at 2, but other than that, I'm good, so. 24 And we did have what happened here this morning, so maybe a 25 good starting point --

MR. SMITH: Right.

THE COURT: -- is to tell me why this is the same or why this is different.

MR. SMITH: I've been drawing VIN diagrams in my mind, and I'm trying to figure out where it departs from what you just heard and where it's consistent.

Now, obviously the main consistency is I represent Lehman Brothers Holdings, and I am the same group of debtors that Mr. Miller just stood up here and defended quite admirably. So I'm not going to deviate really from any of the arguments that Mr. Miller has made with respect to the agreement, which is by the way, the same prime brokerage agreement that you heard so much about during the Stonehill argument.

So very quickly and let me see if I can spot the differences. First and perhaps the biggest is that there are no fraud claims --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. SMITH: -- asserted in connection with this.

So that's headline number one. Headline number two, this is not a diminuation (sic) claim, as you'll see in a moment.

What happened is that the Newport folks perhaps were smarter and a little more on the ball than the Stonehill folks, and they actually put in an order to move the portfolio from

Lehman Brothers to Credit Suisse, and I'll walk you through

steps in just a minute.

The securities are, in this situation, happened to be held at LBIE, I don't think that makes a difference between what you've just heard with regard to Stonehill. It does add a different -- an additional agreement called the margin lending agreement, which is an engagement directly with LBIE.

And this is, as I just said, not a holder claim.

There's no claim here that they were somehow lulled into or seduced into letting things stand as they were. So again, the two claimants are Newport Global Opportunities Fund and Newport Global Credit.

They -- each of them entered into the same prime brokerage agreement that you've just seen with respect to the Stonehill agreements. And in addition, they entered into a margin lending agreement with LBIE because as practice was on this account, the securities were often in the custody and under the control of LBIE.

Mr. May, who was the declarant on behalf of the claimants, very helpfully put in a supplemental declaration in which he describes a prior instance in 2007 in which they moved a small set of securities. Those were also at LBIE, so there is no claim here that they didn't know that the securities were being held at LBIE in London.

So the debtors are 18 debtors, we're not -- LBHI

is not at issue on the guarantee claim here. These are strictly contract claims, and they are contract claims with respect to 18 debtors, not including LBHI. And we will get to this later, although because you didn't reach this point in the Stonehill decision, as I heard you -- Your Honor's ruling, you were accepting as the initial gating issue the exculpation, the two exculpation clauses --

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. SMITH: -- the extraordinary events clause and the gross negligence clause.

But it is -- it's important to have in mind as you're thinking about this joint and several liability issue that you heard something about during Stonehill, just what the nature of these 18 debtors are. They're -- these are -- not one of them is a prime brokerage -- is able to perform the prime brokerage function.

And just to, so you get some comfort on this, among these debtors that are being sued for this enormous obligation because of a mishap that occurred in London in transferring securities, they are included, that is to say Newport folks are suing CES Aviation, which is one of three other or four other CES entities being named as liable for their trading losses. That's a -- these are the companies by which Lehman kept and maintained its aircraft.

They've included among the debtors who are

responsible for these trading losses, LB Rose Ranch, which is an entity that LB -- that Lehman Brothers created to run a golf course and some other properties.

They've included among these debtors as being liable for their trading losses, a Hawaiian hotel operation that Lehman Brothers had separately established under a special purpose vehicle. And they've included among the entities that are responsible for these trading losses, the special purpose vehicle that held the headquarters building up on 7th Avenue -- on 6th Avenue.

So if we need to, we will get to that prime brokerage, but I just want you to understand exactly who these defendants are, or who these debtors are that are being tagged with the liability for these trading losses.

So I think to get us right to the point, which is the operation of the two clauses that you have accepted, in effect, Judge Glenn's reading of the extraordinary events clause, some people called a force majeure clause or the gross negligence clause. I'm comfortable with either one of those clauses, because as the gating issue it precludes all contract liability.

And to illustrate why that's the case, I'm just going to hand up, if it's okay --

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. SMITH: -- these are the three e-mails, three

Pg 103 of 205 Page 103 1 of the e-mails that Mr. May, the declarant on behalf of --2 THE COURT: Does counsel for Newport Global have these? 3 UNIDENTIFIED: Yes, I do, Your Honor. 4 5 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 6 MR. SMITH: I previewed those with him before the 7 argument started. 8 I'm doing it this way only because they're out of 9 chronological order in the May declaration. So -- but let's 10 see what this tells us, and I'm have in mind particular this 11 allegation, the gating issue allegation of was there gross 12 negligence on the part of Lehman Brothers, whichever one of 13 these debtors you want to describe. 14 Here's what happens very simply. We are told in 15 the May declaration and we don't have a document, but Mr. 16 May asserts in his declaration that on September 10, which 17 was a Wednesday, he had -- he says in his declaration on 18 page 47, "I instructed Lehman Brothers to transfer all of 19 the Newport funds securities to Credit Suisse Securities." 20 That's all he says, he doesn't attach a document, but we'll 21 take that as true. 22 The securities he's talking about is a very large portfolio of bonds. Just by way of illustration, you can 23

see there's five pages I'm holding up here of attached lists

of CUSIPs and securities that were in -- there's probably

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five and a half or six pages. So that's the portfolio.

And on September 10, we're told that Newport has resolved, because there is frankly a rush to the exits going on during that final week, and Newport is awake enough to say on Wednesday, look, I want you to -- so that we accept as having, in fact, happened.

So let's just track what occurs next and keep in mind again the standards by which we are to be held, which is a standard of gross negligence, which the case law will tell you, it must be something that truly smacks of intentional wrongdoing and mistake, it has to be a very aggravated set of circumstances.

So we know from Mr. May's own e-mail traffic that the next thing that happens is the very next day, September 11, a Thursday. In the morning, a Lehman representative sends him an e-mail and says, "I called, but got your voice mail."

So right off the bat we know that my guy is on the ball, he is calling to follow-up on whatever instruction was delivered, apparently orally because there is no written instruction the previous day.

He then lists what he needs to have in order to carry out the transfer, and item number one, two, three, four, five on that list, you'll see a settlement date should be T plus 2. That's from -- you know, from the reading the

papers, that's what this thing is all about. T plus 2 as we show is T plus two business days to settle the trade.

So Mr. May and Newport has been told as of Thursday at least, that if they expect this transfer to work, it's going to be on a T plus 2 basis.

Turning to the next document, we have which is -THE COURT: What about that last line, "I have
been advised the transfer has to be versus payment"?

MR. SMITH: Frankly I don't know what that means.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SMITH: The next event is on -- these string of e-mails is the next morning. I take this as a warning from Mr. Rockmon (ph) from Lehman Brothers who is telling Mr. May, "Good morning, Roger. Any transfers initiated today will need to be T plus 2 settlement." So he's told Mr. May, get me a letter of authorization and warning once, not once but twice, it's going to be T plus 2 settlements.

And Newport, perhaps not having the crystal ball, and in fact, nobody having a crystal ball at that precise on that Thursday or Friday decides not to do anything, he waits until the very next day, Friday. And he does this at 12:05 we see as the next document.

Mr. May gets around to preparing a letter of authorization that he was told he would have to provide in order to move to the next step of initiating and completing

Page 106 1 a transfer on a T plus 2 basis. So that arrives at -- well, 2 it says 12:05. Now, I -- Mr. May is based in Texas, so we 3 can assume that's 1:05 New York time, in other words, London is closed at that hour. 4 5 So we know from the record that Mr. May has put 6 before the --7 THE COURT: So let me just pause on the time 8 zones. 9 MR. SMITH: Sure. 10 THE COURT: This says 12:05 p.m. It's emanating 11 from Texas --12 MR. SMITH: Texas. 13 THE COURT: -- so therefore it is --1:05 in New York. 14 MR. SMITH: 15 THE COURT: -- 1:05 a.m. New York time --16 MR. SMITH: P.m. 17 THE COURT: 1:05 --18 MR. SMITH: In the afternoon on Friday. THE COURT: 12:05 p.m. -- hold on. Yes, it's 1:05 19 20 p.m. New York time, and therefore, it's in the evening in 21 London. 22 MR. SMITH: Yes, it's five hours, there's a five hour difference. 23 24 THE COURT: Okay. 25 But the point is that by now the --MR. SMITH:

THE COURT: COB had occurred in London.

MR. SMITH: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SMITH: And this was, as we know, a very large portfolio that they were asking to transfer and we also know that going into that weekend, there was a great deal of turmoil. I think everybody would accept that set of facts and the Court can take judicial notice.

As of Friday when this -- when the letter of authorization finally arrived to initiate the transfer, the question then becomes what did Lehman Brothers do in order to carry it out.

Now, Mr. May also attaches e-mails confirming that the trade got booked on Friday. So good for Lehman, it was on the ball, it got -- when the letter -- as soon as the letters of authorization came in, they booked the trade. But it didn't settle the next day, on Monday, it was actually scheduled to settle on Tuesday, but it didn't -- nothing could happen on Monday or Tuesday, because as we know, very early in the morning in London, LBIE went into administration, and PWC came on the scene and things were effectively and completely locked down.

And so from that point onward from the perspective of these debtors, or from LBIE's perspective, there is nothing more that could be done, and we had no visibility

into what was occurring within the administration of that estate because the PWC's administration then effectively takes it out of our hands.

I'm told that the commencement of the administration proceedings was around 8 or 9 in the morning in London, so that means we're talking 3 o'clock certainly in the morning, well before anything else happens at -- in Lehman New York.

And besides the point, this was a T plus 2 settlement, and if we count the two business days, we're really talking about the commitment being made to complete this transfer by Tuesday and no sooner. So the question is --

THE COURT: Is T plus 2 market or was that an extraordinary settlement term?

MR. SMITH: It was the -- it's within market.

Sometimes it's --

THE COURT: It's within market.

MR. SMITH: -- T plus 3 frankly, so it's a little bit better. We've seen both. We've cited the Court to an SEC website to show that settling issues are usually counted by business days. And we cited the Court to a case called Shaw v Citibank in which there is -- that practice confirms that it's going to be two days of -- two business days. I think it was three days perhaps in that one instance. But

the point is, business days.

It doesn't really matter because when you get an order late on Friday afternoon, and you can't -- certainly you can't expect it to be settled until the Monday at the earliest, and by then, no doubt about it, no dispute, LBIE is in lockdown position.

And so the question is, what did Lehman, we'll call it Lehman in the general sense now, what could Lehman have done with that state of play on Friday afternoon. And what it did do is it booked the trade, and it had to stand back and wait for Monday morning to arrive. And when Monday morning arrived, events had overtaken them, and it was out of their hands. And there cannot possibly be an argument here that there was gross negligence.

You have to remember that also going into that weekend who knew what was going on with Lehman. It wasn't until Sunday, this is all a matter of record, it wasn't until Sunday that Lehman knew that for sure that the Barclay's transaction would fail, and that the Fed wouldn't fund it. But that's really beside the point as well because you have to look at this, the conduct of Lehman for purposes of this gross negligence from the perspective of the guy on the trading desk. And certainly the people on the trading desk didn't know, and it came as quite a surprise to all of them no doubt on Monday morning when the whole world changed

for them.

So we go back then to the two provisions that you've already analyzed at some length with the Stonehill advocate. We have the forced majeure clause, it's -- or the extraordinary events clause which is I think is probably a more accurate description because it is -- it does, as you've pointed out, fit this set of circumstances to a tee.

LBIE had gone into administration. That is the functional equivalent of suspension of trading. If you look at the Judge Glenn's decision in MF Global, it was almost identical language. In MF Global it says suspension or termination of trading, but it's essentially the same thing.

So -- and this is clearly written so that if there are events that are out of Lehman's hands, and that certainly is a condition that occurs outside of Lehman's control, that this extraordinary events exclusion would apply, without the need to resort to a negligent standard.

We're just as happy applying the paragraph 30 of the PBA, the limitation of liability clause, which says that "Lehman Brothers shall not be liable in connection with the execution clearing handling," which is what this falls under, "purchasing or selling of securities or" -- and some ellipses, "or other action except for gross negligence or willful misconduct."

So the very tall order that Newport has in this

case, is that it has to convince you, that little series of steps that I've shown you through the e-mails somehow amounts to gross negligence in the handling of those securities.

THE COURT: So even if I'm wrong with respect to how I read the force majeure clause, even if --

MR. SMITH: Even if.

THE COURT: -- even if implied in the force majeure clause is a carve-out, public policy exception for gross negligence and willful misconduct, the point is it doesn't matter because assuming I take as true Newport Global's allegations, there's been no gross negligence or willful misconduct.

MR. SMITH: That's exactly right. And just a footnote and I think it's -- it'll be helpful for you just to understand where things are. In one respect, if you're talking about breach of contract and that's all this really is, is just a breach of contract claims, what position was Newport left in ultimately after passage of many years, no doubt, but just so you know, LB -- and they concede this in their papers, they were paid off by LBIE in connection with the administration.

What's only -- the only thing that's left for Your Honor ultimately if this were to go forward, would be a differential of \$13 million. Because LBI used one kind of

exchange, one exchange rate for the pound sterling as part of its administration, which is \$1.79 to the pound, whereas under the plan, the confirmed plan here, the allowed claims were computed at \$1.56 to the pound.

so that results in a \$13 million delta, which is really all that's left. They've been paid in all other respects. Now, I'm not saying that to say that they're crybabies, I'm saying that to point out in terms of the breach of the contract, they are in no worse position having left the securities of LBIE and having gone through that lockdown, they are in no worst position that they would've been had they stayed at LBI, or had been returned to them by some miracle Friday afternoon within hours of them having put in the letter.

So I think that's enough to put you into the picture and apply what your rulings have been in Stonehill, and I'll just --

THE COURT: But let's talk about the guarantee claim, right.

MR. SMITH: Yes, there is no guarantee claim before you.

THE COURT: I'm sorry?

MR. SMITH: There is no guarantee claim before you, so I'll make it simple. This -- the claims initially included a guarantee claim, and there were objections.

Page 113 1 THE COURT: Yes. 2 MR. SMITH: As part of the objection process, they raised for the first time in our understanding some 3 4 guarantee evidence that was not part of -- we didn't believe 5 was part of their discovery. We took the guarantee issue 6 because it looked as though there might then be an issue of 7 fact that we had to get through, and we took it off the 8 table. 9 THE COURT: Okay. I missed that. 10 MR. SMITH: Right. 11 THE COURT: I missed that episode in the story. 12 MR. SMITH: I know it's a --13 THE COURT: How did we not -- how did we miss 14 that? What should I be looking at? 15 MR. SMITH: So you're --16 THE COURT: What did I miss? 17 MR. SMITH: I guess it's when -- let me ask one of 18 my associates. It's -- at some point, there's a transition 19 where it is withdrawn. While they look for the docket --THE COURT: Okay. 20 21 MR. SMITH: -- entry that tells you that --22 THE COURT: Okay. 23 MR. SMITH: -- there were 19 debtors including 24 LBHI with a guarantee claim. 25 THE COURT: Okay. Just so you know, and I'm not

	Page 114
1	being a crybaby, the aggregate dockets in these cases are
2	probably approaching 100,000 entries. There's no way. Our
3	computers would start to smoke if we tried to follow the
4	docket, so we very much rely on the parties to let us know
5	when something happens like that.
6	If we did and we missed it, I totally apologize.
7	But if
8	MR. SMITH: My concern is it may have been a
9	little too nuanced, so that may which would be our fault,
10	but at least it's good news, you don't have to think about
11	it.
12	THE COURT: Yeah, okay, it's on a
13	MR. SMITH: There was a notice of withdrawal.
14	THE COURT: Yeah, there was a notice of
15	withdrawal.
16	MR. SMITH: Do you have document 47564?
17	THE COURT: Yes. Yes.
18	MR. SMITH: All right. So that
19	THE COURT: Which is document number 47,565
20	MR. SMITH: Proving your point.
21	THE COURT: just to be clear.
22	MR. SMITH: So we've made it simple
23	THE COURT: Okay.
24	MR. SMITH: I think for you.
25	THE COURT: So what is it so those you're

	Page 115
1	I'm sorry. Tell me again.
2	MR. SMITH: Okay.
3	THE COURT: You've withdrawn your motion to
4	dismiss?
5	MR. SMITH: We've withdrawn there is no
6	sufficiency challenge
7	THE COURT: To the guaranteed claims.
8	MR. SMITH: to the guarantee claim.
9	THE COURT: Okay.
10	MR. SMITH: In fact, I think all LBHI, any claim
11	against LBHI, whether it's guarantee
12	THE COURT: Okay.
13	MR. SMITH: or joint and several liability or
14	anything else.
15	THE COURT: Right. That was efficient because
16	that's what I was going to tell you would've been the result
17	if the argument on the guarantee claim was that survives
18	MR. SMITH: Okay.
19	THE COURT: the sufficiency hearing.
20	MR. SMITH: Yes. I that was lurking in our
21	minds and we didn't want
22	THE COURT: So, Mr. Steel, you won that one
23	without
24	MR. SMITH: to waste your time.
25	THE COURT: really breaking a sweat.

Page 116 1 Thank you, Your Honor. MR. STEEL: 2 THE COURT: All right. So why don't I hear --3 MR. SMITH: And then the only other issue really is this joint and several liability. I think you've heard a 4 5 lot about that, and we are in the position. 6 THE COURT: Okay. So that being said though, and 7 let me get back to my -- the question that I was going to 8 ask before I got sidetracked. So the guaranteed claim is --9 survives a sufficiency hearing. 10 MR. SMITH: It will live beyond this, yes. 11 THE COURT: Okay. 12 MR. SMITH: We're not making sufficiency 13 challenge. 14 THE COURT: Okay. So let's take the allegations 15 as true. Let's say --16 MR. SMITH: If you --17 THE COURT: I'm trying to fill in your VIN 18 diagram. 19 MR. SMITH: Uh-huh. 20 THE COURT: If there's a good sufficiency claim, 21 is that precluded --22 MR. SMITH: If a good guarantee --23 THE COURT: -- if it's a good guarantee claim, I'm 24 sorry, is that precluded by 29 or 30, or is that a separate 25 If I say to you, I agree with you, 29 and 30 applies claim?

Page 117 1 even more clearly here than it did in Stonehill, based on 2 what you've taken me through even without even getting what 3 you've taken me through? MR. SMITH: I don't think I can rely on the 4 5 exculpation. I think the guarantee --6 THE COURT: The guarantee claims stands on its 7 own. 8 MR. SMITH: I'd have to look at what they're 9 saying about it, but I think that the guarantee would stand 10 on its own. 11 THE COURT: Okay. I think so too, but I -- you 12 know, I was trying to fill in the VIN diagram, but I think 13 the guarantee claim stands on its own. 14 MR. SMITH: Yes, if you look at it as a sort of a 15 blanket guarantee of whatever loss you suffer, we'll somehow 16 make it good --17 THE COURT: Right. 18 MR. SMITH: -- just come see Uncle LBHI and he'll 19 take care of it. 20 THE COURT: Right. It's not hooked into the prime brokerage agreement. 21 22 MR. SMITH: That's right. I don't think you can 23 take it up because that comes afterwards. 24 THE COURT: Okay. 25 MR. SMITH: But that's for another day and

Page 118 1 frankly, I don't think it'll ever occur, because I expect 2 that LBIE will true up that 13 in -- over the course of --3 THE COURT: Okay. I got it, okay, very good. 4 Thank you. 5 MR. SMITH: Thank you. 6 MR. STEEL: Good afternoon, Your Honor. THE COURT: How are you? I apologize again for 7 8 making you wait so long. 9 MR. STEEL: Oh, no worries at all. Howard Steel 10 of Brown Rudnick on behalf of Newport Global Opportunities 11 Fund and Newport Global Credit Fund Master. With me is my 12 partner, Andrew Dash. 13 THE COURT: How are you, Mr. Dash? MR. DASH: Pleasure to be in your courtroom, Your 14 15 Honor. 16 MR. STEEL: Your Honor, I dare maybe snatch some 17 victory on the guaranteed claims from jaws of defeat, but there's a little dispute I think from Mr. Smith's last 18 19 comments that --THE COURT: Okay. 20 21 MR. STEEL: -- well, it doesn't matter. Well, it 22 matters a lot to us. We briefed in our response the 23 guarantee issue. We're confident it's a good claim --24 THE COURT: Okay. 25 MR. STEEL: -- we're very sensitive to your late

Page 119 1 square ruling that otherwise allowable quarantee claims 2 should be permitted to be allowed. Well, it was just taken off the calendar unilaterally by Lehman. We didn't consent 3 to that. They said in their notice is they're trying to 4 5 streamline the proceeding, yeah, three hours in, so 6 that's --7 THE COURT: Okay. So now --8 MR. STEEL: Your policy -- I just --9 THE COURT: Now, I'm really -- now, I'm confused. 10 So they -- they're withdrawing their 12(b)(6) objection --11 MR. STEEL: Right. 12 THE COURT: -- to your guaranteed claim, that's a 13 good thing for you. 14 MR. STEEL: Right. 15 THE COURT: Right. So -- but I'm hearing you 16 complain so I don't understand. 17 MR. STEEL: Well, it's not otherwise allowed just 18 because they're withdrawing the sufficiency challenge. 19 THE COURT: Right. MR. STEEL: We're still in limbo. We'd like the 20 21 assurances that that guaranteed claim which we think are --22 is bona fide is designated as allowed. 23 THE COURT: Well, but that's not the next step. 24 The next step is now that it survived a sufficiency hearing 25 and now we're going to have discovery, I suppose, and you're

Page 120 1 going to go forward. Unless you think that you're entitled 2 to -- and I don't want to again trip over procedure here, 3 but unless there's something in the case management order 4 that suggests otherwise, if you believe that you can make a 5 summary judgment motion. Then under 7056(1) you would ask 6 for a conference and ask to do that. But it feels very 7 facty to me --8 MR. STEEL: Right. 9 THE COURT: -- particularly on the issue of 10 reliance among others, knowledge, so that's where we would 11 be going next. So they don't win, but you haven't won yet 12 either. 13 MR. STEEL: Great. 14 THE COURT: Okay? 15 MR. STEEL: And I don't mean to trip over the 16 procedures --17 THE COURT: Okay. MR. STEEL: -- and I'll revisit the procedures. 18 19 just wanted some reasonable assurance that they would engage 20 in such discovery and I have a right to --21 THE COURT: Oh, that --22 MR. STEEL: -- prosecute and move this claim 23 forward. 24 THE COURT: So, Mr. Smith --25 We've just got the back of the hand. MR. STEEL:

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	Page 121
1	THE COURT: you don't disagree with any of
2	that, right?
3	MR. SMITH: No, in fact, I'm waiting for discovery
4	because
5	THE COURT: Okay.
6	MR. SMITH: I'd like to test this claim, Your
7	Honor.
8	THE COURT: Okay.
9	MR. STEEL: Well, I heard the opposite. He said,
10	well, we'll never have to address this claim, so.
11	THE COURT: No, I think he was I didn't take
12	the comment that way.
13	MR. STEEL: Okay.
14	THE COURT: And we're not going to wait for that
15	to occur. You've got a claim
16	MR. STEEL: Okay.
17	THE COURT: and we'll go to discovery. Right?
18	MR. SMITH: I'm told that there are some very
19	there are procedures
20	THE COURT: Yeah, that's what
21	MR. SMITH: that must be followed
22	THE COURT: Right, that's what
23	MR. SMITH: and we're following those
24	procedures
25	THE COURT: That's what I was saying.

Page 122 1 MR. SMITH: That's what I assumed would happen now 2 till we withdraw. 3 THE COURT: Right. But I think what Mr. Steel is 4 saying, you don't get now to go back into your bunker and 5 wait it out. 6 MR. SMITH: No. And he has the tools, I believe, 7 to --8 THE COURT: Right. 9 MR. SMITH: -- move things forward. 10 THE COURT: Okay. All right. Great. 11 MR. STEEL: Okay. We'll do that because we have 12 been waiting six and --13 THE COURT: Okay. 14 MR. STEEL: -- a half years on these claims. 15 THE COURT: Okay. 16 MR. STEEL: I just want to go quickly through the 17 scorecard, Your Honor, because my paramount point is to show 18 you how far outside the MF Global box we are on one hand, 19 and how unique we are from the 200 or so other prime 20 brokers, customers with these contracts. We think we're a 21 special case and the facts actually put us in a different 22 place when you evaluate the exculpation provisions and the 23 joint and several liability question. 24 Your Honor, let me just identify the things that I 25 take issue with on Mr. Smith's statements. He goes, that

Page 123 this dispute, we've already been paid off by LBIE, we have no harm, but then on the other hand, he acknowledges under their confirmed plan, this is at least a \$13 million dispute, that's meaningful. We also have unliquidated claims that if they survive this 12(b)(6) that we'd want discovery on those claims. THE COURT: What are those? MR. STEEL: There's -- I can walk Your Honor through each of the claims, but the unliquidated portions are --THE COURT: You mean attorney's fees and the like? MR. STEEL: Well, things like that, and also for the failure to be able to participate in corporate events attached to the securities. While our securities were not returned after recall, there is ancillary damages. We weren't able to participate in (indiscernible) or rights offering, we weren't able to --THE COURT: So consequential type damages. MR. STEEL: Those type of damages but --THE COURT: Okay. MR. STEEL: -- I think that we could fit under the contract, given I'll show you, and I'll walk you through which sections of the PB agreement they're directly liable

on a contract basis.

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THE COURT: Okay. That's -- but those all go in the bucket of in the guaranteed claim, you would assert those, right, as part of the guaranteed claim? But that doesn't really have a bearing on whether or not the claims, the contract claims survive 29 or 30, right? The existence of those types of -- the allegation of the existence of those types of damages don't change the analysis as to whether the predicate events here get you out of the application of the force majeure or the exculpation clause, right? MR. STEEL: Right. The exculpation still remain a gating issue. I think it comes in on joint and several liability, that's why I raise it now. THE COURT: Okay. MR. STEEL: And we can address it on the back end or whenever Your Honor would like, by looking at the elements of the claims. And that just gets another thing on my scorecard, he passed and said, that we didn't have any claims on fraud. We do have an element of a fraud in the negligent misrepresentation claim with respect to the CapCo bonds which were insurance backing for LBI and LBIE. It's in our proof of claim, it's part of our claims. THE COURT: Can you point that out to me? Sure. Let me find the claims. MR. STEEL:

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Page 125 1 in paragraph 3 and 10 of our addendum attached to the myriad 2 proofs of claim. And it relates -- I'm sorry, Your Honor, I --3 4 THE COURT: Go ahead, go. 5 MR. STEEL: It relates -- I've got to jump around 6 a little bit. We filed two declarations of --7 THE COURT: Uh-huh. MR. STEEL: -- Roger May, Mr. Smith referenced 8 9 I know Your Honor has read and is familiar. As Exhibit G to the first May declaration was a document called 10 11 a 2007 customer asset protection overview. 12 THE COURT: Okay. 13 MR. STEEL: This is a document produced with 14 Lehman Brothers on the top, and throughout it makes 15 references to Lehman Brothers, the credit protection it 16 provides, its PD customers as a holistic enterprise. 17 There's a lot of interesting things in this 18 document, and the declaration goes through how we obtained it, oh, Lehman Brothers gave it to us because we were 19 20 getting concerned about their credit protection as the 21 credit markets were in the boiling waters. 22 It says a couple of interesting things, and the two most important for this is that one, LBIE benefits from 23 a para guarantee from LBHI, we'll deal with this down the 24 25 road. And two, that the benefit from this CapCo insurance

- that any PB customer would have the back stop of a third party insurer, that would satisfy any claims under these contracts.
- So to the extent we have pled a fraud, a negligent misrepresentation claim that set forth our claim, I just take an issue, and this is just an overview or scorecard, I still think Your Honor's right that the exculpations are the gating issues.
- 9 THE COURT: But this doesn't take me out of that 10 issue, right?
- MR. STEEL: No. No.
- 12 THE COURT: No.

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- MR. STEEL: I just wanted to identify what I thought Mr. Smith was wrong on in terms of the scorecard of issues to address. And then I'll dive into to sort of the overview and the exculpation provisions.
 - Just two more points on Mr. Smith's --
- THE COURT: Uh-huh.
 - MR. STEEL: -- presentation. He goes on a lot about, well, it was accepted that our securities were at LBIE. Well, there's no evidence to that effect and I'll get into our position. Our declaration sets forth our position that there's no evidence where our securities were at all. That we had a prime brokerage, and you spent time with the Stonehill proceedings saying that under this contract, the

prime brokerage agreements opened up at LBI.

All right. Well, there was an MLA agreement and that provides certain rights for LBIE -- Lehman affiliates like LBIE to lift and take some of the securities that are pledged for things like loans, right.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. STEEL: Well, that's in fact, in our story what LBIE did. It took our client's Newport securities en masse and in violation of application U.S. and SEC customer protection rules, and took them and used them in their own borrowing base and rehypothecated them in trading at the benefit of the Lehman enterprise.

All right. Well, the point being is that upon the recall, and it's -- now is an appropriate time to really go through the timeline, Lehman never provided us with any evidence. And since they haven't provided us evidence were our securities were at the time of the recall.

And now I think it's a good time for me to address the timeline.

THE COURT: Does that last statement have any impact on the gating issue?

MR. STEEL: Yes, because it impacts gross negligence. We claim from the get go that the rehypothecation by LBIE in violation of U.S. laws is part and parcel an element of our gross negligence claim because

Page 128 1 they rehypothecated, because they didn't have effective 2 control of our securities. 3 When we recalled them on Wednesday, the 10th, 4 Lehman was unable to transfer them per our instructions. 5 Right. And I'll walk you through the time, but the --6 THE COURT: Wait, wait. 7 MR. STEEL: -- gross negligence claim --8 THE COURT: Wait, wait, wait, wait. 9 MR. STEEL: Uh-huh. 10 THE COURT: You didn't recall them on the 10th. 11 You -- someone made a phone call. 12 MR. STEEL: Right. And --13 THE COURT: And then at 11:18, Mr. Ramond (ph) 14 told Mr. May, hey, Roger, I need an authorization letter. 15 Right? Now, so the interesting thing is when you get to the 16 authorization letter, which was sent mid-day on Friday, you 17 know, the authorization letter would've taken approximately 18 45 seconds to generate. 19 So --20 MR. STEEL: Okay. Let --21 THE COURT: Okay. So that doesn't work. 22 MR. STEEL: Well, let me walk you through how I 23 think it works. I think Mr. Smith sort of spun it a little 24 bit. We filed a supplemental declaration at Docket 48062, 25 that's the one that Mr. Smith referred to.

Page 129 1 THE COURT: See, I'm already over 48,000. 2 MR. STEEL: I know, oh, my goodness, I can't 3 imagine. What does that say? 4 THE COURT: 5 MR. STEEL: A lot of paper. The supplemental 6 declaration though says, that Lehman was able to make a 7 transfer of many millions of Newport securities in the blink 8 of an eye, in less than a few hours, Lehman was able to 9 effectuate the transfer or recall of the transfer of these 10 securities. 11 So it's unquestioned in the record before Your 12 Honor that they had the ability and they had the capacity to 13 do same day transfers. 14 THE COURT: All right. But -- okay. But now 15 we're -- I mean, and we are on the sufficiency hearing. 16 MR. STEEL: Yes. 17 THE COURT: The documents that you put in show this chain of events that at least commenced in writing with 18 19 Mr. Ramond's getting back to Mr. May, right. So there's no 20 document back from Mr. May saying, Mr. Ramond, T plus 2 21 doesn't cut it, here's -- attached is our authorization. 22 The authorization doesn't come in for, you know, over 23 however many hours, and then you're up against the weekend. So I don't -- I'm still not following you. 24 25 MR. STEEL: Right. That gives this credibility

this was a more national flowing relationship. There wasn't -- in the contract, there's no set procedures when you want to transfer securities.

THE COURT: Do you think it's a good idea for securities to be transferred without a letter of authorization? You don't think so, I'm sure you don't.

MR. STEEL: Well, I'm opining on that, I'm just saying that the contract doesn't specify the procedures that were in place for the transfer. The letter of authorization could memorialize something that's already in place, that's already in process.

He also pointed -- let --

THE COURT: If that existed, Mr. Steel, I think you would've given it to me. I think you would've given it to me and then said, this Ramond -- this is a smokescreen because he didn't need a letter of authorization, he had blanket -- I mean, I can't even imagine how that would work, right. I'm sitting at a desk at Lehman Brothers and I get a voice mail from somebody saying, hey, you know, I'm Roger May, transfer my \$150 million of securities to, you know, Credit Suisse. It's not going to happen, right, so I'm trying hard to follow what you're saying, but I'm not getting there.

MR. STEEL: My only point through the supplemental declaration is when there's appropriate authorizations

Lehman had the capacity to transfer instantaneously, if not for a short delay. That's my point. So if you're accepting the predicate that September 10th the phone call was insufficient, September 11th, Lehman's acknowledgement that they would transfer the accounts, if that's insufficient, but then on the 12th, they get the letter of authorization and say that the --

THE COURT: After --

MR. STEEL: -- recall is booked.

THE COURT: -- the close of business in London.

MR. STEEL: Why does -- why is it only LBIE. We have no proof in the record that LBIE was in control of this when LBI was the prime broker in New York. Every phone call, every fax, every order, every trade went through New York. There's no evidence otherwise.

THE COURT: Okay. But then -- so if I meet you on that ground, if I assume, and I wasn't aware that that's where you were going with this, that the securities were actually at LBI not at LBIE.

MR. STEEL: We don't know first and foremost.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. So suppose they were at LBI, then here comes this e-mail at 12:05 on Friday, September 12th, then you're telling me that then it was gross negligence or willful misconduct for that -- the trade not to have closed in the next four hours and 55 minutes on

Page 132 1 Friday, September 12th, given everything else that was going 2 on? MR. STEEL: Well, not in the next four hours. The 3 4 next six years plus. I mean, that's an exaggeration, but 5 let me walk you through the next and the subsequent days and 6 why it turns into a claim for gross negligence. 7 So we're still on that Friday, the 12th, it's our position that Lehman had the capacity when they got the 8 9 letter of authorization --10 THE COURT: Can I just ask you to stop, because 11 I'm really just stuck on this LBI versus LBIE --12 MR. STEEL: Us too. 13 THE COURT: -- issue. And let me ask Mr. Smith, I 14 mean, is this an issue here? Because your whole 15 presentation was keyed off of, and we know what happened 16 next, LBIE went into administration. Am I -- so am I 17 missing something here? MR. SMITH: No, Your Honor. The agreement with 18 the parties included placing securities at LBIE, in fact, 19 20 there's a margin lending agreement for that purpose with 21 LBIE. 22 THE COURT: Okay. So two separate issues. One, 23 where were the securities actually? 24 MR. SMITH: Oh, as to that, no doubt. Whether 25 they say they knew it or not, there is no doubt they were at

Page 133 1 LBIE. Because that's who paid them. They made a claim in 2 the LBI administration and got paid by LBIE. 3 THE COURT: Oh, that's an excellent point. You made a claim in the LBIE case. 4 5 MR. STEEL: We made a claim against LBI also and 6 the Chapter 11 debtors. 7 MR. SMITH: And I was just reminded, that they 8 made a claim in the LBI case. 9 THE COURT: Yes, he did. 10 MR. SMITH: And it was disallowed. 11 THE COURT: Correct because --12 MR. STEEL: Only because it was part and parcel of 13 a 9019 between the two estates, LBI and LBIE. 14 THE COURT: Okay. Let's not be cute. As you're 15 standing here today, do you know where the securities were? 16 MR. STEEL: We do not. And I have never seen any 17 evidence of where the securities physically were located on the 12th. 18 THE COURT: Well then, you know, we have a huge 19 20 problem because then if 9019 or no 9019 there are standards, 21 and to the extent that the securities were not at LBIE, then 22 that shouldn't have been an allowed claim. I mean, I'm just 23 -- now, I'm really confused. 24 MR. STEEL: Well, Your Honor, we always thought we 25 had an allowed customer claim against LBI. We took

extensive discovery. We were here on the first day, I see Hughes Hubbard colleagues here, we were a hornet in their nest. I mean, we buzzed, buzzed, buzzed that -- the SIPA trustee of the obligation of a term and securities because of what this contract says that we're a prime brokerage customer of LBI, right.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. STEEL: When it came to post-petition, three years in when LBI and LBIE negotiated a settlement between the two massive estates --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. STEEL: -- we weren't in a position to say, oh, we want to get our securities still back from LBI when we're standing to receive an allowed claim against LBIE because the market was --

THE COURT: Okay. I mean, maybe this is much ado about nothing. To the extent that the securities were at LBI, then the point that the administration occurred on Monday becomes beside the point. But to the extent that the allegation is that the securities were actually at LBIE, and LBI didn't have the authority to transfer -- to rehypothecate them to LBIE, then I still don't think that solves the general problem of the applicability of the force majeure or the exculpation provisions.

MR. STEEL: All right. Let me walk you through

Page 135 1 the rest of the timeline and --2 THE COURT: Okay. 3 MR. STEEL: -- I'll walk you through how we're outside the exculpations. 4 5 Mr. Smith makes a lot about T plus 2. I still 6 don't think that there's -- because they cite to a rulebook 7 on the purchase and sale of securities, that's a far 8 different thing than the recall of your property. 9 Again, I think it's belied that T plus 2 is new to 10 the relationship. It's never been before a part of a trader 11 transfer. There's no evidence that in the contracts that it 12 wasn't business days, or it wasn't just calendar days. So I 13 think it's a real disputed fact what -- the T plus 2. 14 THE COURT: Well, it might be a disputed fact, but 15 the question is then, can I say that number one, if I don't 16 imply a gross negligence willful misconduct carve-out into 17 the force majeure clause, it doesn't matter. You say I 18 should, but it doesn't matter. 19 If I assume that there was gross negligence or 20 willful misconduct, which I don't, but if I do, then I could 21 still say as a matter of law, that the force majeure clause 22 applies nonetheless. Because of the --23 MR. STEEL: So let's go -- I hear you, I hear you. 24 THE COURT: Okay.

So let's go to Section 29, force

MR. STEEL:

Page 136 1 majeure --2 THE COURT: Okay. 3 MR. STEEL: -- clause. Let's get into the substance of it. All right. So they say -- I still wanted 4 5 to make one more point on the timeline --6 THE COURT: Sure. 7 MR. STEEL: -- it'll go really, really quick. 8 THE COURT: Go ahead. 9 MR. STEEL: That on Sunday, the 14th, it turned 10 the lights on here in New York and did tens of thousands of 11 transfers and transactions for favorite customers, why was 12 Newport out of that box? And then now we get to the fabled 13 15th, right? The plan administrator claims that the force 14 majeure now comes into play, because all of our claims are 15 allegedly caused, directly or indirectly, by quote, 16 government restrictions and suspension of trading. That's 17 the two --18 THE COURT: Uh-huh. MR. STEEL: -- clauses used in the force majeure 19 20 provision that's at issue. 21 All right. Our first argument that we're outside 22 of that is that the claims aren't based on government restrictions or suspension of tradings. The claims are 23 based on Lehman's failure to recall and return the customer 24 25 property in advance of any of those waters getting onto our

Pg 137 of 205 Page 137 1 toes, that's why the timeline is so important, that we 2 should've been (indiscernible), we should've been smooth sailing outside of any insolvency proceeding or any 3 purported suspension of trading or government restrictions. 4 5 So that's our first argument why Section 29 is not 6 applicable. And just to add to that, Section 29 doesn't even say insolvency proceedings. It says government 7 8 restrictions and suspension of trading. 9 THE COURT: Right. I went through that this 10 morning. 11 And let me get to our other MR. STEEL: True. 12 argument, other than the claim has nothing to do with 13 restrictions or suspensions, it's all about failure to 14 return and recall securities. 15 Your Honor, they spent a lot of time briefing this 16 issue, and they spent six and a half years, right, before we 17 got to litigate this on a 12(b)(6), six and a half years, 18 and now they're saying to a force majeure clause, well, I don't see any evidence that there's a government restriction 19 20 or suspension of trading in play on the 15th. I got the 21 LBIE administration order --22 THE COURT: You don't? MR. STEEL: -- here, right here, right here, this 23

Right.

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25

is the LBIE --

THE COURT:

Page 138 1 MR. STEEL: -- administration order. 2 THE COURT: Okay. And it said, LBIE's 3 administration business as usual? MR. STEEL: It doesn't say that there's suspension 4 5 of trading or government restriction. It does not say it. 6 And under UK law, under UK law, as I understand there's 7 no --THE COURT: Was LBIE still trading after it went 8 9 into --10 MR. STEEL: Yes. 11 THE COURT: It was? 12 MR. STEEL: There was no automatic suspension of LBIE completed a substantial number of trades 13 trading. post-administration. They cite in their papers. In fact, 14 15 one of the early progress reports from the administrators 16 was, in the context of OTC trades in limbo, they said, well, 17 suspension of trade is not practicable or desirable. It 18 would adversely affect the administration and recoveries of 19 beneficiaries, right. 20 Look how the trust claimants, how it evolves their 21 positions, people like Newport, the hedge funds stuck in the 22 morass. Prior to the UK high court rejecting a proposed 23 scheme for the return of their property, then they modeled 24 the CRA, which everybody fits under in this, well, what was 25 the administrators doing? They were entering into bilateral

negotiations with people like Newport on how to effectuate these transfers.

THE COURT: That's what you mean by there was no suspension of trading?

MR. STEEL: How -- if you're talking to me about how to give me my property back, how is there suspension of trading? I can get my property back from you, I don't read that as a suspension of trading. And that's our other position, that the UK administration order, UK law and the actual events on the ground didn't effectuate a suspension of trading. There might have been an insolvency proceeding, there might have been an automatic stay saying I couldn't bang on their door, but they sure as -- they could've returned and recalled my securities.

And that's only the 15th, Your Honor, right.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. STEEL: We've got four more days until the 19th in the SIPA proceeding. So that -- then we're now talking about how we're so far outside MF Global, right.

First Newport's not submitting a diminution in value claim, this is in the SIPA claim. We're not like Stonehill. And second, Lehman had nine days before the SIPA order, and what that provided for came into play. And if you look in the context of the nine days, or as Your Honor says, seven days between the letter of authorization --

Page 140 1 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 2 MR. STEEL: -- in my mind, that's gross negligence for not being able to transfer many millions of a customer's 3 property at risk during Lehman -- this isn't a fire, this 4 5 isn't a riot, this wasn't an act of terrorism, it was --6 THE COURT: But if it -- where do you allege that 7 you don't know where the securities were? 8 MR. STEEL: Well, I think we've alleged it in the 9 four or five 2004 applications we filed over the last six 10 years. 11 THE COURT: No, no, in the actual pleadings. Not so much? I mean, in the proof of claim, because before -- a 12 13 half an hour ago, it wasn't on my radar screen at all that 14 what you really were saying was that the securities weren't 15 at LBIE they were actually at LBI. 16 MR. STEEL: Well, be mindful, this is our proof of 17 claim dated September 18th, 2009. 18 THE COURT: Yeah. MR. STEEL: We say in the first paragraph on 19 20 information, believed the account remains with and under the 21 control of LBI and was not transferred to Barclay's Capital 22 or other third parties in connection with a mere sale. THE COURT: Okay. 23 24 MR. STEEL: Remember, we filed a 2004 to answer 25 this question the first day.

Page 141 1 THE COURT: Okay. 2 MR. STEEL: We went over to England to answer this 3 question, we've been asking it, Judge, we just haven't gotten much clarity and it's very convenient for them to say 4 -- it's a no brainer, their securities were with LBHI. LBHI 5 6 filed for administration, there was a government 7 restriction, our hands were tied, force majeure kicks in. 8 Those aren't the facts that we understand them to be. And 9 this is a 12(b)(6) we should get the benefit of exploring 10 whether our facts are correct. 11 Your Honor, they still raise the other 12 exculpation. 13 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 14 MR. STEEL: We still have joint and several 15 liability, if you want us to address those too. 16 THE COURT: What do you mean, they --17 MR. STEEL: If we get through the exculpation 18 gating, they're still saying that the debtors aren't liable 19 for these claims. 20 THE COURT: Right. 21 MR. STEEL: He said we sued a golf course, a 22 hotel, and a plane financing company. 23 THE COURT: Right. 24 MR. STEEL: And we have arguments with respect to 25 that if you want to hear it. Our papers go into pretty good

Page 142 1 detail. 2 THE COURT: No, let me hear from Mr. Smith again 3 on this new --4 MR. STEEL: Okay. 5 THE COURT: -- late breaking issue of where the 6 securities actually were. Thank you. 7 MR. STEEL: Thank you. THE COURT: So, Mr. Smith, talk to me about LBI 8 9 and LBIE and talk to me about this notion that there wasn't 10 actually -- well, that if the securities were at LBIE there 11 wasn't really a suspension of trading that would've 12 precluded the return of the securities. MR. SMITH: Okay. And different --13 14 THE COURT: And if those are -- if I shouldn't 15 even be thinking about those issues, you can tell me that 16 too. 17 MR. SMITH: Right. Let's start with where are the 18 securities. The securities on Monday morning, as they were, I believe on Friday and Thursday prior, were at LBIE. 19 20 There's no -- I can't imagine that there's a dispute about 21 that. 22 THE COURT: Okay. They're reacting --23 MR. SMITH: They say that they --24 THE COURT: -- with consternation to your 25 statement. So --

MR. SMITH: Okay. So they may not -- they may say that they didn't know. That's fair, you didn't know.

That's -- you can take that position. But you certainly knew when you were told Monday morning that they were on lockdown at LBIE, that that's where they were.

And I'm assuming that that's lead that they got on that Monday morning is what led them to go over to London, meet with the administrator, and start the negotiation that eventually ended up with an allowed claim that got paid.

so I think that's where you and I are confused about what Mr. Steel is saying, is he's saying, I didn't realize that they were at LBIE until that Monday morning when the world turned upside down. Or is he saying, I don't even know that they're still at LBIE, because that can't possibly be true. He got paid by LBIE.

THE COURT: Well, there seems to be -- he seems to be leading me to look beyond the world of T plus 2, and that was a whole different set of arguments, that Monday is not the operative day. A, Monday is not the operative day on the -- at a sufficiency hearing because for all we know, the securities might have been at LBI, and then that the wait was longer, and they could've traded at that point.

So that seems to be one argument.

MR. SMITH: So the theory -- yes. The theory would have to be they were really at LBI --

Page 144 1 THE COURT: Right. 2 MR. SMITH: -- and LBI could've closed out that 3 Monday. 4 THE COURT: Exactly, yes, and it was grossly 5 negligent --6 MR. SMITH: But they moved it to LBIE --7 THE COURT: Oh, I don't think we get to the -- I 8 don't think I'm hearing that they moved it to LBIE, I think 9 it was just that it -- for all we know, it was at LBI, yes, 10 I have an allowed claim against LBIE, but that was a 9019, 11 that was a settlement driven by settlements between LBI and 12 LBIE, and the securities might have been at LBI, and if they 13 were, then it was grossly negligent to not close them out, 14 because oh, look, they can transfer securities within a 15 couple of hours. 16 MR. SMITH: Well, I'm puzzled that they would take 17 that position. It reminds me of the \$100 billion cash 18 hypothetical that you have, because it is so contrary to 19 fact they received and they've attached it as an exhibit, 20 Exhibit M to the May declaration is Mr. Rockmon e-mailing back on the 15th to say, it's the very last exhibit in his 21 22 declaration, "I'm sorry to advise, all accounts under the 23 LBIE entity are under lockdown and we have lost access to 24 them," which is a simple statement of what the facts were. 25 "The administrators for the receivership is

Page 145 PricewaterhouseCoopers and they will advise us in due course on the road plan." Now, I can't imagine that they're truly challenging that proposition and really what Mr. Rockmon was doing was hiding that it was being held at LBI. So I don't accept that as a creating an issue of fact. THE COURT: So -- and if there were -- so then the next level is that okay, let's assume they were at LBIE, they were wrongfully hypothecated by LBI to LBIE, right? MR. SMITH: Okay. THE COURT: So you would say -- you're going to say to me, well, that doesn't matter. MR. SMITH: It's a) doesn't matter because the -that's not their problem. Their problem was they put in the order on Friday, and LBIE went into lockdown on Monday. So it's too bad for them, they were just a little bit too late in getting their paperwork together. So rehypothecation --THE COURT: But if there was a wrongful --MR. SMITH: -- it --THE COURT: -- a so-called wrongful rehypothecation then --MR. SMITH: We don't -- I don't -- frankly I don't know what they mean when they talk about a wrongful hypothecation. But let's assume something was wrong. All right. Let's assume they did something that

they didn't have the contractual authority to do.

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1 THE COURT: Right.

MR. SMITH: Well then, what they did was breach the prime brokerage agreement. And the breach of that agreement is now precluded, a claim for breach unless there was gross negligence, has been precluded by either one of --either paragraph 30 or paragraph 29 of the prime brokerage agreement. So they can talk all they want about they did some weird thing with the rehypothecating and lifting securities, a) I don't believe that there's anything wrong; b) I don't know that that happened. It's because we don't have visibility into what was going on at LBIE. And c) they allege this on information and belief, and they have been working with the LBIE administrator for the past six years and never --

THE COURT: But you don't -- not to get into disputed facts, but there's the margin lending agreement, right? I mean, the fine line --

MR. SMITH: There is a margin lending, which allows --

THE COURT: -- with your position is that it completely allows the rehypothecation of the securities, right?

MR. SMITH: Yes. And I suspect they'll say, well, there are certain circumstances that you have to have a loan-out or not a loan-out. We don't know any of these

Page 147 1 things. 2 THE COURT: I'm just looking at the -- in the MLA. It should be paragraph --3 MR. SMITH: THE COURT: 4 5(e)? 5 MR. SMITH: That's an E or C. 6 THE COURT: Right. 7 MR. SMITH: Any collateral together with --8 THE COURT: All right. So okay. 9 MR. SMITH: So -- but let's assume something was 10 wrong, that we didn't do something, we did something wrong 11 by whatever because of something that LBIE did. I'll make 12 it easy for you, you don't have to get to that issue, 13 because it is that kind of a claim is excluded by the gross 14 negligence limitation and liability. 15 If that was gross negligence to allow LBIE to do 16 something with the securities, it'd have to be gross 17 negligence in order for it to survive at the sufficiency 18 stage. 19 THE COURT: It would have to have been gross 20 negligence by LBI to have transferred the securities to 21 LBIE. 22 MR. SMITH: LBI to have transferred it, to put 23 them in harm's way with something. 24 THE COURT: Right. 25 And, of course, LBIE had been the MR. SMITH:

trading partner that these guys had used for years. So there's nothing wrong in allowing securities to be held at LBIE. That was actually what these fellows expected would happen with those securities. So that answers the, I believe, the rehypothecation and the location issues.

This -- I'm troubled by the notion that there are these unliquidated claims that corporate -- they couldn't vote securities or certain corporate events that they don't describe, it's all --

THE COURT: Classic consequential damages.

MR. SMITH: Exactly. That's also in that same paragraph, paragraph 30 precludes claims for consequential damages. So those go out the door.

He says that there's a CapCo fraud claim. Well, that's not what this claim is. The claim, as they've attached it in their Exhibit A to their proof of claim, is a breach of contract, you failed to capitalize CapCo or get a surety bond.

So that is -- they don't ever use the word fraud until well into these proceedings, when they have Mr. May say that they were -- somehow it was fraudulent not to do what they were supposed to do with the surety bond. But that's -- Mr. Miller has already gone through that with you. Those are the economic loss, you can't dress up a breach of contract as a fraud.

Page 149 1 So I hope I've answered your questions. 2 THE COURT: Yes, you have, thank you. 3 MR. SMITH: Okay. Thank you. All right. Mr. Steel, quickly. 4 THE COURT: 5 MR. STEEL: Yes. I'm sorry, Your Honor. 6 THE COURT: Don't be sorry. 7 MR. STEEL: Howard Steel on behalf of the Newport 8 Funds. 9 Oh, gosh, Your Honor, this is a 12(b)(6) and I heard a lot from Mr. Smith we don't know, and that's a lot 10 11 of the problem, we tried to roll up our sleeves --12 THE COURT: All right. But it's a 12(b)(6), but 13 it's also a Rule 11, okay. So you need to be standing up 14 here and looking me in the eye and telling me that, as you 15 stand here today, you're telling me gosh, gee, we don't know 16 where those securities were? 17 MR. STEEL: Yes, that's correct. Let me tell you 18 what I think happened from our limited dribs and drabs of discovery from the SIPA trustee, you know, less discovery 19 20 from the joint administrators. We tried, we've cast our net 21 wide, we acknowledge that. 22 THE COURT: I just want to like flash some lights, because this is a big moment. Okay. This is a big moment. 23 24 I'm not about cutting off claims prematurely or deciding 25 disputed issues of fact on sufficiency hearings or

12(b)(6)'s and I'm actually heartened by the fact that, in fact, the objections to the sufficiency objection to the guaranteed claim was withdrawn, because I think it has legs.

On the other hand, I believe notwithstanding the language that you read me in the proof of claim, I don't believe that you actually don't know where those securities were. And if you're going to tell me that that's actually what's going on here, you know, that's kind of a big thing.

MR. STEEL: Well, it's what I am telling you because --

THE COURT: Pleading in the alternative is one thing, lawyers do that all the time. But we're now many, many years out and Mr. Smith has pointed me to documents reflecting statements that indicated that, in fact, the securities had -- were at LBIE, and has also said that you acted on that in meeting with folks in the UK. He just said that.

Okay. So if you're going to tell me that you're resting your claim on the factual question of where were the securities, and therefore, you want the ability to make out a claim for gross negligence because the securities were actually still at LBIE, is that really what you're saying?

MR. STEEL: What I'm saying is that there's no evidence, there's no record, there's no documentation that on the 15th the securities were stuck at LBIE. We have no

record that the securities were stuck at LBIE. I thought
Mr. Smith was just saying that we've dealt with the UK
entity in terms of relaying instructions, right, to purchase
or sell, right, that would make sense. We had a margin
lending relationship with LBIE.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. STEEL: LBIE had certain rights, but just by U.S. law, to rehypothecate, to lift the securities up from what we thought they resided at LBI, the contract that we signed, the prime brokerage agreement says, prime brokerage agreement will be opened up at LBI, you identified that in the Stonehill proceeding. That's what we understood. We knew that LBIE had certain rights to lift and take those securities --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. STEEL: -- within U.S. law and then do what --

THE COURT: And then on Monday, the 15th, after Mr. May tries to get the securities back, a letter arrives that says, gee, I'm so sorry, I can't give you your securities back, because LBIE's in administration.

MR. STEEL: All right. Well, there's a couple of points on this that still makes it really everybody in the dark. This is coming from a New York person, Ramond is in New York, there's no dispute on that.

THE COURT: Right.

1 MR. STEEL: So why is he -- why are we talking 2 with somebody from New York from just Lehman Brothers --3 THE COURT: Because you asked for your securities 4 back, and that's who you dealt with, and the guy who's 5 telling you that he sent your securities to the UK is 6 responding with the --7 MR. STEEL: But he didn't say that he sent the 8 securities anywhere. He just said -- the only thing he said 9 was they're on lockdown. I don't know what lockdown means. 10 And lockdown doesn't -- lockdown can mean many different 11 things. 12 THE COURT: Now, you've moved to a different 13 point. You've moved to the suspension of trading point. 14 MR. STEEL: All right. Well then getting back to 15 the where were the securities. We sought discovery for 16 that. Discovery was not given to us. What was given to us 17 was limited discovery of those things, was a document called 18 a sub-custody agreement. It's a document -- it's in the record in these 19 20 proceedings, I can direct Your Honor --21 THE COURT: No, that's okay. 22 MR. STEEL: -- although I think we got it in 23 discovery (indiscernible). And the sub-custody agreement if 24 I recall is an agreement between LBI and LBIE whereby LBIE 25 takes these rehypothecated securities and has them at LBI in

Pg 153 of 205 Page 153 1 LBIE's name. That's why there was all these inner-debtor 2 conflicts with --3 THE COURT: Right. MR. STEEL: -- respect to where the securities 4 5 were, who had rights to the securities. That's why it 6 wasn't so easy for them to just transfer the securities back 7 to Newport. So our point is we did not know with clarity where 8 9 the securities were. Some I think were rehypothecated in 10 the ether and they weren't -- Lehman was unable to recall --11 THE COURT: Now, there's a new place they might 12 have been, LBI ether? 13 MR. STEEL: It was the two -- no. THE COURT: Okay. Do you have any points that you 14 15 want to make to wrap up? MR. STEEL: Your Honor, I think we've fleshed out, 16 17 of course, around the exculpation provisions. I think in 18 real brief, Section 30 for all the same reasons, because there was no clear handling of these accounts for the 19 20 reasons that we said that it's unclear that anything was in 21 fact handled, we think that exculpation is not applicable. 22 And I think we can rely on Mr. Brilliant's 23 statements for the joint and several liability argument, in 24 addition to our proof of claim specifies the contractual

provisions where Lehman Brothers, the joint enterprise, were

responsible.

ultimately doesn't matter.

THE COURT: Okay. Any last licks, Mr. Smith?

MR. SMITH: No, I don't think so, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Many, many interesting points, but at the end of the day, I don't believe it matters where the securities were, whether they were at LBI or LBIE. I hesitate to give a lot of credence to the allegation that there was some uncertainty, but it

I think that putting the guaranteed claim to one side which was made clear to me it has been done, I think these claims fall at the feet of paragraph 29 or paragraph 30 whether or not a gross negligence willful misconduct exception is read into the -- what I've been calling the force majeure paragraph, paragraph 29. And even if the securities were still at LBI, I don't think it matters.

These claims don't survive a sufficiency hearing.

That being said, all the damages including the alleged

consequential damages can be sought in the further

proceedings in the guarantee action.

All right. So I would ask that you -- I mean, if for the purposes of appeal, I mean, if you need a longer opinion, I'd be happy to elaborate for the purposes of the order, however, the basis of my ruling is that I believe that this is on all fours with Judge Glenn's ruling in MF

Global, and I think it's equally applicable here. And I see -- I've heard nothing that takes me out of that construct.

So for the purposes of -- let's talk procedure, for the purposes of appeal, we can have an order, we can agree that it's not final, we can wait to see what happens at the end of the day. If it becomes something that needs to go up on appeal we, of course, will write an opinion. It has to go in the queue with everything else, so it's not going to be accomplished very quickly.

I assume you'll agree on discovery. Do you need me to do anything else?

MR. SMITH: No, I think we're done with that.

Thank you.

THE COURT: I'm waiting for this conference.

MR. STEEL: I'm sorry, Your Honor --

THE COURT: Is there something else, Mr. Steel?

MR. STEEL: -- Howard Steel from -- we just want to acknowledge for the record we do need to preserve our appellate rights.

THE COURT: Sure. So my question is, what do you want to do? Do you want this to become a final order, I don't -- if so, then I'm going to write an opinion. I'm happy to do it, happy to do it, it's just not going to happen really quickly. So what I was suggesting to you was, we could have an order, have it not be final, and then when

Page 156 1 you get to the end of the day -- I mean, if you win on your 2 quarantee claim, it rather renders moot the other claim. 3 I'm trying to preserve all of your rights, I'm not 4 trying to deprive you of any of your appellate rights. 5 MR. STEEL: Your Honor, Howard Steel again, can we 6 have till the end of the day for the determination, so I can 7 talk to --8 THE COURT: Oh, sure. Just figure out whatever 9 works for you is fine with me. I just am trying to give you 10 a disposition in a way that moves it along, but I don't want 11 to eclipse any of your appellate rights whatsoever. But 12 take your time. All right? I'm going to go take a break before the 2 13 Okay. o'clock hearing. Thank you very much. Good to see 14 15 everyone. 16 (Recessed at 1:48 p.m. and reconvened at 2:10 p.m.) 17 THE COURT: All right. Sorry to keep you waiting. 18 I'm ready when you are. 19 MR. COX: Your Honor, good afternoon, Stewart Cox 20 for the Defendant, Wellmont Health Systems. 21 Based on some of the arguments I heard earlier and 22 the Court's questions, I'm guessing this is going to be an 23 easy one for Your Honor to tackle. 24 THE COURT: Yes, actually. 25 MR. COX: And hopefully it won't take quite as

Page 157 1 long. We have -- Wellmont has before the Court a motion to 2 dismiss. 3 THE COURT: Right. MR. COX: A motion to dismiss three of the four 4 5 claims, counts in the Lehman adversary complaint and as the 6 Court may know, Lehman on Friday dismissed the two 7 Bankruptcy Code claims. 8 THE COURT: Right. 9 MR. COX: So we have one claim --10 THE COURT: Counts I and IV. 11 MR. COX: Correct. 12 THE COURT: Right. 13 MR. COX: One claim left that's the subject of the 14 motion to dismiss, and that's the breach of the implied 15 covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim. 16 And the primary point that I want to offer the 17 Court today in this argument is that the implied covenant claim and the breach of contract claim that's Count I that 18 we're not addressing the motion, and even the two bankruptcy 19 claims that were dismissed, the entire case rests on certain 20 language on a document that we call the certifications. 21 22 And that language is quoted, as the Court knows in 23 the complaint --24 THE COURT: Right. 25 MR. COX: -- and all four counts, and now we're

talking about Count IV. That's the entire predicate for the implied covenant claim. And as Your Honor knows from our motion, our argument is, our legal argument is the implied covenant claim is redundant. It duplicates the breach of contract, the express contract claim that they have in Count I.

So that's our argument. And if the Court will indulge me, I'll back up a little to explain the background with the contract, and then I'll come back to the certifications that's the documents of the subject of their adversary proceeding complaint.

THE COURT: So the -- you dispute that the certifications are contract, right?

MR. COX: Correct.

THE COURT: Okay. So if the certifications can't support, if the certifications are a contract then do you lose or do you say I think the certifications are not a contract, but even if you hold that -- find that they are, we didn't breach anything?

MR. COX: Correct on both counts.

THE COURT: Okay. But then, but then you get to the issue of the breach of the implied covenant and good faith and fair dealing which is implied in every contract governed by New York law. So even if there is no breach of an express provision of a contract, there can be a breach of

the implied covenant with good faith and fair dealing, that's read into the contract.

So I'm trying to figure out whether this is a, you know, a semantic difference, if you will, because I believe that there is a cause of action for the breach of a covenant and good faith and fair dealing that can prevail subject, you know, based on factual record, even if there's no breach of another express provision of a contract. Okay?

MR. COX: Yes.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. COX: Let me respond this way, if the complaint had only an implied covenant count, or implied covenant count plus the two bankruptcy counts that were dismissed, we wouldn't be attacking that implied covenant count with a motion to dismiss, because we're not saying they don't have a cause of action. What we're saying is, they can't both coexist.

THE COURT: But what if their complaint said complaint, complaint in one count? Okay. Breach of contract, recitals, recitals, recitals, paragraphs, paragraphs, and then there's a paragraph that says, they're liable because they breached the express provision set forth in paragraph XXYY, they breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, wherefore, we get -- we win. One count just two different contractual provisions; one

express, one implied.

MR. COX: Because the way they have the complaint pled is not -- there's no implied term that's even pled in the complaint. The complaint rests entirely on the language in that certifications document that they have quoted --

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. COX: -- in the complaint. That's why they're redundant. And that's why these New York cases that we've cited to the Court say, you can't have both. And to pick up on the Court's about it being semantics, why would it matter if they're pleading the same thing in one count, versus pleading the same thing in two separate counts? Because at the end of the day, the Court's going to look at what they're really alleging to support the breach of contract theory, whether it's on an express term or implied term, and the Court is going to see this is based on specific language that's in that certifications document.

THE COURT: But it's based on specific language, but even if I were ultimately to conclude that there was no breach of the specific language, but that the course of conduct constituted a breach of the covenant of good -- of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, I could still find in Lehman's favor.

MR. COX: I can't argue against that, Judge. But we could hypothesize about different ways. They could plead

Page 161 1 the complaint. 2 THE COURT: Right. 3 MR. COX: And that's not what we have today, what we're facing. What we're facing right now is a complaint 4 5 that has two different counts that duplicate each other. 6 THE COURT: But you're telling me that they can't 7 plead both, right? 8 MR. COX: Correct. 9 THE COURT: And I'm telling you that they actually 10 can plead both. So I hope -- have you read what I've 11 written about the breach of the covenant of good faith and 12 fair dealing? 13 MR. COX: I don't know that I have, Your Honor. 14 THE COURT: All right. Well, some young person 15 who works for you didn't do their job. Because if you look, 16 you'd see it, I had a decision on the issue of the breach of 17 covenant of good faith and fair dealing. MR. COX: Is it in this Lehman case? 18 THE COURT: No, it's not in the Lehman case, it's 19 20 another case called Lightsquare. 21 MR. COX: All right. 22 THE COURT: It doesn't matter, though, because it's a contract claim. So, you know, I don't want to --23 24 I'll let you continue to try to convince me --25 MR. COX: No, I --

Pg 162 of 205 Page 162 1 THE COURT: -- but I'm just kind of letting you 2 know --3 MR. COX: Okay. 4 THE COURT: -- that it's going to be an uphill 5 battle. Thanks. 6 MR. COX: Thank you, Judge. 7 THE COURT: So but if you would rather that the 8 counts be combined so that we have a breach of contract 9 claim and that as life moves on, they either have to prove a breach of an express provision, or demonstrate the breach of 10 11 the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing all under the rubric of a contract claim, that's -- we can do 12 13 that. I mean, I don't think that it really matters. We're 14 going to go to trial, apparently not here, unless you 15 consent, which I'm guessing after today you won't. I'd be 16 delighted to have you, but you know, we still -- it's still 17 going to be the same record however you sort it out, right? MR. COX: Right. We do think there is a 18 19 substantive difference between what Your Honor has 20 articulated and how it ought to be pled and the way it's 21 pled today. So understanding how the Court is inclined to 22 rule on this, we do feel like it's at least incumbent on Lehman to amend the complaint to set forth a breach of 23 contract claim as the Court has articulated it in one count. 24

THE COURT: Let me hear from Lehman, Mr. Cohen.

Page 163 1 You know, from my perspective, I don't think it really 2 matters, but you may have a different view. I'm trying to preserve the cause of action because I think that Lehman's 3 4 entitled to go forward and attempt to prove one or the other 5 or frankly both, because they're I think in this 6 constellation of alleged facts, there is room for both. 7 what do you think, Mr. Cohen? 8 MR. COHEN: Good afternoon, Your Honor, David 9 Cohen, Milbank Tweed Hadley and McCoy on behalf of Lehman 10 Brothers Holdings, Inc. and Lehman Brothers Special 11 Financing, Inc. 12 I think the issue with redundancy and the cases 13 that deal with that are concerned with the potential for 14 double recovery on a single theory. 15 THE COURT: Yeah. 16 MR. COHEN: And that's absolutely not --17 THE COURT: Not on the table at all. 18 MR. COHEN: We're not at all. THE COURT: 19 Right. 20 MR. COHEN: And if Wellmont conceded that the 21 certifications were part of the contract, then we wouldn't 22 need the implied covenant. But as we sit here today, there 23 is a question as to what's covered by the contract --24 THE COURT: Right. 25 -- and what isn't. And that's why we MR. COHEN:

pled in the alternative.

And in the motion to dismiss papers, they seem to suggest that we missed some special language by saying in the alternative, we'd pled breach of good -- covenant of good faith and fair dealing. We've looked at the Rule 8 cases, we don't think we have to. We think it's fairly clear we understand, and we've understood from the beginning that at least as we view the case and the facts, once the Court determines whether the certifications are part of the contract or out of the contract, the nature of the case changes.

And we're either going with breach of contract on the certifications as part of the contract, or we're going with the certifications as part of the expectations and the reasonable expectations of the party at contract formation, and they're --

THE COURT: Down the implied covenant path.

MR. COHEN: Exactly.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. COHEN: And they're post contract conduct to frustrate the performance.

THE COURT: Well, that's the way I see it. So there's no chance of double recovery, and I didn't understand Lehman to be seeking a double recovery.

MR. COHEN: Absolutely not.

THE COURT: It's just kind of classic alternative pleading and the cases that say you can't do both, I think are just, you know, they're just a little misleading. Because I think in this -- you know, this is -- would be a classic example of a case in which you need to be able to pursue both. I mean, the undisputed facts that we have, i.e., you know, the redemptions, you know --MR. COHEN: Right. THE COURT: -- I mean, it's frankly a very fascinating set of facts and legal issues. But I don't think that, Mr. Cox, that I want to put the debtors through the additional expense of, you know, trying it again and risking that we haven't said in some -- that they haven't pleaded in some magic way that parties could differ about. They have a cause of action I think that survives a 12(b)(6) for express, for implied. And then at the end of the day, they'll either prevail on one, or they'll prevail on the other, but not both. So I'm inclined to just deny the motion with respect to Count IV, leave it the way it is, and you know, let's move on. MR. COHEN: That would be fine with us, Your Honor. THE COURT: And I'm delighted that you came up to enjoy our -- you brought us the sunshine actually.

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1	MR. COX: You have a beautiful
2	THE COURT: So for that, we're thankful, but you
3	better get out quickly because the temperature is going to
4	be dropping.
5	MR. COX: No further argument on that, Judge.
6	THE COURT: Okay.
7	MR. COX: I did want to ask the Court one more
8	question here, and Your Honor may not have had a chance to
9	see it yet. We submitted a
10	THE COURT: I did. A confidentiality
11	MR. COX: Exactly.
12	THE COURT: a protective order.
13	MR. COX: Right. And the only reason I bring it
14	up now is we have a deposition coming up on February 25
15	where we probably will use documents that are
16	THE COURT: Okay. So I will enter this. I'm
17	going to go in the stack and this will get entered by the
18	end of the day. Today, Mr. Cohen, you had no issues with
19	this?
20	MR. COHEN: No, we commented on earlier drafts,
21	the defendants accepted our comments, and
22	THE COURT: Okay.
23	MR. COHEN: the version reflects those.
24	THE COURT: Okay. We need an electronic copy.
25	UNIDENTIFIED: E-mail my (indiscernible).

MR. COX: Fine.

THE COURT: All right. So if you can't do that today because you're in transit, then we'll enter it as soon as we get it. But surely we'll enter it by the time of your deposition.

Can I clarify something, because this is back to me after denial of a motion to withdraw the reference, right? So I am going to take this through trial or not. I know that it's clear that I don't have authority to enter a final order, right or not right? But -- well, that's what the district court said.

MR. COX: Well, as the Court knows better than me, this is of course is a jurisdictional thicket, but I don't understand the need for us to play ping pong with the district court --

THE COURT: Your words not mine.

MR. COX: All right. Well, I do have to be careful because she still has her thumb on us, but I don't see the need to submit a report or recommendation to the district court just on a motion to dismiss. As the --

THE COURT: Okay. I wasn't -- I agree with you on that, and the motion to dismiss, no. I'm beyond that. I'm at the after trial or summary judgment.

MR. COX: Okay. I'll just say, Wellmont is not to that point yet, Judge.

Page 168 1 THE COURT: Okay. 2 MR. COX: We've got a lot of discovery to do and then we probably will file a summary judgment motion in this 3 4 court, and it's probably too early for us to --That's fine. 5 THE COURT: That's fine. 6 want to note what the district court said in the order 7 denying the motion to withdraw the referencing and come 8 back, so let's all just remember to revisit it, revisit that 9 issue as and when it becomes relevant, but it doesn't really 10 affect what we do. 11 MR. COHEN: We will, Your Honor. 12 THE COURT: Okay. All right. So you'll send us 13 the protective order by e-mail, and will you send us an 14 order on Count IV as well? 15 MR. COHEN: Yes, we'll prepare that and send that 16 back to you and Ms. Stewart (ph) will get your comments on 17 that. 18 THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you so much. Thank you, Your Honor. 19 MR. COHEN: 20 THE COURT: Good day. 21 (Proceedings concluded at 2:26 PM) 22 23 24 25

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